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THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE:  
HOW LEGAL DOCTRINE THRIVES ON SKEPTICISM 
JESSIE ALLEN† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article starts with a puzzle: Why is the doctrinal approach to 
“proximate cause” so resilient despite longstanding criticism? Proximate 
cause is a particularly extreme example of doctrine that limps along de-
spite near universal consensus that it cannot actually determine legal 
outcomes. Why doesn’t that widely recognized indeterminacy disable 
proximate cause as a decision-making device? To address this puzzle, I 
pick up a cue from the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law 
professors, and judges, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, compared legal 
doctrine to ritual magic. I take that comparison seriously, perhaps more 
seriously, and definitely in a different direction, than the realists intend-
ed. Classic anthropological studies reveal several telling structural simi-
larities between traditional proximate cause analysis and ritual magic. 
Moreover, it seems that in diverse cultural contexts, magic not only sur-
vives skeptical exposure, it feeds on it. Drawing on the anthropological 
literature, I propose that exposing doctrinal indeterminacy functions as a 
kind of ritual unmasking that ultimately increases rather than diminishes 
the credibility of doctrinal analyses. The Article concludes by consider-
ing how unmasking doctrinal indeterminacy works to strengthen faith in 
doctrine and by raising some questions about the implications for law’s 
legitimacy. Does unmasking doctrine only further mask judicial power? 
Or can ritual theory help us see some potential legitimate value in main-
taining doctrine as the form of legal decision making, even as we 
acknowledge doctrine’s inability to determine legal outcomes? 
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INTRODUCTION 
[T]here is a relation between faith and skepticism . . . that has es-
caped notice in some classic illustrations of magical healing . . . in 
that the success of such ritual lies not in concealing but in revealing 
trickery . . . . 
—Michael Taussig
1
 
Legal concepts do not decide cases. Lawyers, law teachers, and 
judges themselves acknowledge that judges do not mechanically apply 
legal doctrines.
2
 Opinions vary on the extent of doctrine’s indeterminacy 
from the observation that “doctrine [is] insufficient to explain judicial 
decisions”3 to the blunt accusation that doctrines are “lies.”4 But most 
  
 1. Michael Taussig, Viscerality, Faith and Skepticism: Another Theory of Magic, in IN NEAR 
RUINS: CULTURAL THEORY AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 221, 221 (Nicholas B. Dirks ed., 1998). 
 2. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the 
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 196 (2011) (“[N]o serious 
analyst would today contend that the decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court are independent 
of the personal ideologies of the judges.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 
50–51 (2010) (“[M]ost everyone accepts some version of the claim that law is indeterminate.”); 
Frank Sullivan et al., Three Views from the Bench, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 328, 330 
(Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (“Judicial decision-making is not syllogism.”); Steven J. Ware, 
The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 767 (2009) (pointing out that judges 
exercise discretion and in many cases make law and that this view of judging is so widely shared that 
“it is virtually impossible to find anybody who disputes it today”); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism 
for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 469 (1990) (explaining that the view that judges make, rather 
than find, legal outcomes “has dominated American legal education for over half a century”). 
 3. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due 
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 793 (2009); see also EDWARD 
H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) (“In an important sense legal rules are 
never clear.”). 
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participants in legal culture agree that doctrinal formulas do not inde-
pendently produce legal outcomes.
5
 Nor is this realistic view confined to 
legal practitioners. Recent research indicates that the American public 
understands judicial decision making as a process that involves political 
choices.
6
 Apparently “we are all realists now.”7 It is no longer controver-
sial, if it ever was, to say that concepts like due process, privity, and 
proximate cause, and the formal doctrines that elaborate them are inde-
terminate.
8
 And yet, doctrine remains the central and distinctive mode of 
legal process. Judges continue to go through doctrinal analyses as if they 
did determine outcomes. Lawyers continue to make doctrinal arguments 
and to couch policy concerns in doctrinal terms. Law professors continue 
to teach doctrinal formulas, albeit with plenty of skeptical commentary.
9
 
And whenever there is a new nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, she is 
required to publicly profess her strict adherence to doctrine as the sole 
legitimate method for deciding legal questions.
10
  
It seems that doctrine revealed is not doctrine debunked. My ques-
tion is, Why not? Why doesn’t indeterminacy disable legal doctrine? 
Why do we persist in using a method to decide legal cases that we 
acknowledge cannot actually make decisions? In this Article, I look at 
this problem in the context of tort doctrines of proximate cause, and I 
suggest a possible explanation for—or at least a new perspective on—the 
survival of formal doctrinal analysis in a skeptical age. 
  
 4. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994). 
 5. See sources cited in supra note 2. Even a rare avowed formalist who argues that doctrines 
should be used to decide cases believes that judges today take an instrumental policy making ap-
proach to adjudication at least some of the time and that it would be “just plain silly” to claim that 
doctrine could determine the outcome of every case. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in 
Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 166, 170 (2006). Another defender of formal legal reasoning nevertheless 
acknowledges that “the self-reporting of judges probably exaggerates the effect of formal law on 
their decisions.” FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 140–41 (2009). 
 6. In a recent survey asking how the U.S. Supreme Court decides cases, 57.3% of respond-
ents “agree that judges actually base their decisions on their own personal beliefs.” Gibson & Caldei-
ra, supra note 2, at 207. 
 7. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (emphasis 
added) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 (1986)). But see 
SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 144 (asserting that the “all” is an “egregious exaggeration”); BRIAN 
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 132 (2006) (noting that most legal academics do not 
identify as either realists or formalists but do view law as a means to achieving policy ends, as the 
realists advocated). 
 8. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 77, 79 (2009). Tamanaha has argued persuasively that judges’ skeptical attitudes about doctri-
nal determinacy long predate the realist critiques of the twentieth century. Id. 
 9. Law professors perennially sigh over students’ naïve demands for determinate doctrinal 
formulas, but as Lawrence Solum points out, most final exams nevertheless wind up testing students’ 
mastery of the very doctrinal formulas we have mocked. Solum, supra note 5, at 168. 
 10. See, for example, Justice Sonya Sotomayor’s statement during her confirmation hearings 
saying that “[i]t’s not the heart that compels conclusions in cases, it’s the law.” Ari Shapiro, So-
tomayor Differs With Obama On ‘Empathy’ Issue, NPR (July 14, 2009, 5:32 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106569335. 
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To really look at the contradictory combination of doctrine and 
skepticism, one has to avoid both denial—the assumption that somehow 
what appears to be contradictory must not be contradictory because it is 
so common—and polarization—insisting that the contradiction between 
doctrinal faith and doctrinal skepticism must be resolved. If unalloyed 
belief in doctrinal determinism is unrealistic, so is the opposing position 
that legal doctrine is nothing but an empty disguise. At the least, neither 
pure faith nor pure skepticism captures the experience of most legal prac-
titioners. For most judges and lawyers, I daresay the habits of doctrinal 
thought and language seem qualitatively different from other forms of 
decision making, yet these same legal practitioners openly discuss doc-
trine’s indeterminacy. 
We need a new way, then, to understand the persistent combination 
of doctrine and skepticism in modern legal practice. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law professors, and 
judges, compared legal doctrine to ritual magic.
11
 In this Article, I take 
that comparison seriously, perhaps more seriously, and definitely in a 
different direction, than the realists intended. When the realists called 
doctrinal analysis “magic” words,12 they generally meant that judges and 
lawyers were engaged in a fraud or fantasy.
13
 To realist critics, doctrinal 
reasoning mirrored the naïve or duplicitous magical practices of primi-
tive cultures that they assumed were devoid of modern doubts about 
magic’s efficacy. According to some anthropological accounts, however, 
magic in other cultures is often characterized by an interplay of faith and 
skepticism.
14
 I find the combination of illusion and revelation described 
by ethnographers of magic strikingly similar to the puzzling mixture of 
doctrine and realism in adjudication. In this Article, I use those accounts 
to investigate how doctrinal practice and doctrinal skepticism manage to 
exist side by side in legal practice. 
Of course, it is farfetched to compare modern adjudication to ritual 
magic. But the goal of this comparison is quite down to earth. I want to 
come to terms with the contradictory combination of doctrinal and skep-
tical analysis that characterizes legal practice. I maintain that the combi-
nation of doctrine and skepticism in judicial opinions is not satisfactorily 
  
 11. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 11–12 (1930); Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935); Leon 
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence, 28 COLUM L. REV. 1014, 1016–17 (1928). 
 12. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 820. 
 13. The exception was Thurman Arnold. In two books he published in the 1930s, The Symbols 
of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism (1937), Arnold explored the “symbolic,” 
“ritual, ” “ceremonial,” and “ideal” character of legal theory and practice in ways that did not deni-
grate those practices. See also Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, 
in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT 
STAKE 306, 312–16, 317–21 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Jessie Allen, A Theory of Adjudica-
tion: Law as Magic, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 803–05 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Taussig, supra note 1. See generally E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, 
ORACLES, AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE passim (abridged ed. 1976). 
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explained either by the realist view of doctrine as fraud, or by what I take 
to be the current mainstream view that doctrinal reasoning is incomplete 
but can be redeemed by combining it with policy analysis.
15
 Comparing 
the doctrine–skepticism combination in modern legal practice to magic–
skepticism in other cultures does two things. First, it is a way to make 
strange the ordinary—to help us recognize that the situation we take for 
granted merits critical investigation.
16
 Second, the comparison with ritual 
magic allows me to draw upon the observations and insights of anthro-
pologists who have explored the puzzling combination of practice and 
skepticism in other social contexts. 
Even with the benefit of comparative anthropology, however, it is 
not obvious why purportedly determinate decision-making techniques 
should survive once they are unmasked as indeterminate. Moreover, in a 
democratic society, there is reason to be particularly concerned about this 
contradiction: In a government “of laws and not of men,”17 judges’ con-
tinued use of apparently indeterminate doctrinal techniques threatens the 
legitimacy of their legal decisions. After all, at the most basic level, law 
is supposed to provide a way to make decisions based on something oth-
er than individual choices.
18
 A judicial technique that only seems to de-
termine outcomes threatens both this basic principle and the democratic 
norm of transparency.
19
 Nevertheless, legal scholarship’s main approach 
to the contradiction between realism and doctrinalism today is uncritical 
acceptance.
20
 This Article confronts the realist challenge in one of law’s 
  
 15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 376 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, HOW 
JUDGES THINK]; Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: “Public Policy” Without Public Politics?, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 841–42 (1993) (noting a “generational change in style” from the first Restate-
ment of Torts in 1935 and the drafts of the third Restatement; the first two made no policy justifica-
tions, but drafts of the third have given policy rationales to explain various tort doctrines); Richard 
A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1996) [hereinafter Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication]. 
 16. The playwright and director Bertolt Brecht adopted a stylistic technique that he called the 
“verfremdungseffekt,” literally translated as the “making strange effect.” Brecht’s goal was to pre-
vent his audience from accepting his plays as a naturally unfolding series of events and thus to 
engage the audience’s critical political judgment of the action on stage. 
 17. 4 JOHN ADAMS, “Novanglus Papers” No. 7, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 106 (AMS 
Press ed., 1971) (1851). 
 18. See Bybee, supra note 13, at 306 (“[T]he rule of law, in its essence, is a matter of requir-
ing people to ‘look outside [their] own will for criteria of judgment.’” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 147 (7th ed. 2007))). 
 19. Transparency is generally considered to be one of the fundamental norms of democracy. 
For example, see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006), 
who describes transparency as “defined broadly as a governing institution’s openness to the gaze of 
others,” and as a “fundamental attribute of democracy.” However, Fenster goes on to analyze the 
many problems and complications with realizing the virtue of transparency. See id. at 889–92. 
 20. Of course there are exceptions. Some critics continue to attack the use of doctrinal reason-
ing as hypocritical or delusional. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 
[FIN DE SIÈCLE] (1997); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON passim (1998). And, 
recently, a few scholars have begun to call attention to the combination of realist attitudes and doc-
trinal forms and to propose new approaches to understanding their coexistence. See KEITH J. BYBEE, 
ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISES AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 4–6, 32–33 (2010); Bybee, supra note 13, at 306–07; Nourse, supra note 3, at 792; 
Solum supra note 5, at 207–08; Tamanaha supra note 8, at 85–88, 90–91. 
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most problematic doctrinal areas— proximate cause—and offers new 
ways to understand the uneasy combination of doctrine and skeptical 
critique that characterize judicial decision making. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes proximate 
cause as a particularly extreme example of doctrine that has hung on 
despite longstanding skepticism about its ability to decide or even con-
strain legal outcomes. Indeed, even those who might challenge my as-
sessment of widespread doctrinal skepticism would likely agree that 
proximate cause doctrines are dubious. All three Restatements of Torts 
have presented traditional proximate cause tests as deeply vexed.
21
 For 
over a century, these doctrinal formulas have been characterized as too 
flexible to determine liability.
22
 Yet courts deciding negligence issues 
routinely invoke proximate cause, asking whether a plaintiff’s injury was 
“foreseeable” or the “direct” consequence of a defendant’s conduct. 
More important, judges sometimes criticize the tests of proximate cause 
as indeterminate and confusing in the same cases where they struggle to 
apply those doctrines. For example, an 1876 Supreme Court opinion 
notes “the oft-embarrassing question, what is and what is not the proxi-
mate cause of an injury,” and then proceeds to the doctrinal analysis.23 
  
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special note (2010) (tak-
ing an explicit “[s]cope of [l]iability” approach and explaining that the term “proximate cause” is an 
“especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected,” i.e., limited liability, and is only 
included because its use remains widespread in practice and scholarship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 435 cmt. d (1965) (discussing the frequent impossibility of reconciling an actor’s inabil-
ity to foresee accidents ex ante and a court’s ability to declare them foreseeable ex post); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. e (1965) (“It is impossible to state any definite rules 
by which it can be determined that a particular result of the actor’s negligent conduct is or is not so 
highly extraordinary as to prevent the conduct from being a legal cause of that result.”); 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. e (1934); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. f 
(1934). But cf. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79–102 (1st ed. 1959); Mark 
F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 301 (2002) (“The two major doctrines 
of proximate cause, direct consequences and reasonable foresight, are not mutually exclusive; in-
stead, they represent different perspectives, both of which can sometimes apply to the same accident. 
The best way to approach proximate cause is to break it down into these two perspectives and then to 
subdivide the pieces. Each of the perspectives contains distinct paradigms.”). 
 22. See Am. Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Urbanski, 162 F. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1908) (“The varying 
circumstances of each particular case make it difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general 
rule, or establish any test, by which the legal proximate cause of an event may be distinguished from 
the remote cause that is outside of legal cognizance.”); Evansville Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Clayon, 
78 N.E. 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1906) (“[T]he issue of proximate cause is considered an issue of 
fact although its determination sometimes requires the application of difficult and obtuse rules of 
law.”); Lewis v. Flint & P.M. Ry., 19 N.W. 744, 748–49 (Mich. 1884) (“[A]pplication of the rule 
that the proximate and not the remote cause is to be regarded, is obscure and difficult in many cas-
es . . . .”); Huffman v. Sorenson, 76 S.E. 183, 186–87 (Va. 1953) (“Proximate cause is a concept 
difficult to define and almost impossible to explain conclusively. Each case must be decided upon its 
own facts and circumstances.”); Scobba v. City of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 809–11 (Wash. 1948) (“[I]t 
is often difficult to apply the rule [of proximate cause] to any given set of facts . . . .”). See generally 
LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE passim (1927); Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 
72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 passim (1924). 
 23. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474–75 (1876). 
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Part II takes off from the realists’ critique of doctrinal “word ritu-
al”24 to compare aspects of proximate cause analysis with magical prac-
tices in other cultures. Before tackling the role of skepticism in both con-
texts, I identify some similarities between doctrinal practices and magic. 
For the legal realists, proximate cause was a paradigmatic example of 
law’s magic words,25 and it turns out to be possible to identify a number 
of magical techniques from other cultures in judges’ use of proximate 
cause doctrines. Among other things, the familiar proximate cause tests 
of foreseeability and direct connection mirror associations of similarity 
and contagion that are thought to produce magical effects. 
Part III makes the case that incorporating skepticism into doctrinal 
analysis actually strengthens doctrinal practice. I argue that the skeptical 
critique of proximate cause resembles a ritual unmasking that increases, 
rather than diminishes, practitioners’ power. What the anthropologist 
Michael Taussig calls “the skilled revelation of skilled concealment”26 is 
part of many a magic ritual in other contexts. The comparison with mag-
ic therefore suggests a possible solution to the mystery of proximate 
cause’s persistence in the face of equally persistent criticism. If revealing 
illusion is part of how magic works, revealing proximate cause doctrines’ 
indeterminacy similarly may strengthen, rather than disrupt, the power of 
adjudicative magic. 
But anthropological accounts of magic do not offer any definite ex-
planation of how skepticism works to strengthen magical practices. I 
propose that in both magical and judicial settings, revealing illusion may 
be a way to incorporate and transcend doubts about the authenticity and 
efficacy of an obviously artificial practice. When practitioners reveal 
artifice, they articulate and embrace doubts about the efficacy of those 
techniques. In so doing, practitioners relieve their own, and their audi-
ence’s, need to suppress those doubts in order to accept magic or legal 
practice as authentic and valuable. Instead of working to hold off skepti-
cism, the participants and audience are freed to concentrate on the skill 
of the magical or legal practitioner as he struggles with an admittedly 
dubious technique to produce results that appear legitimate. Instead of a 
conflict between practitioners’ attempts to maintain illusion and skepti-
cism about authenticity, the judge or magician joins skeptics in recogniz-
ing the limits of his practice, freeing them to marvel at the skill with 
which he uses those same, limited formal techniques to produce results 
that are recognizably magical or legal. Selective exposure of practical 
artifice may thus inspire overall confidence in the practitioner’s efforts to 
circumvent illusion and deliver real results. From this perspective, doc-
  
 24. Green, supra note 11, at 1016. 
 25. See id. at 1022; Cohen, supra note 11, at 820. 
 26. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222. 
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trinal tests like proximate cause exist in part to be debunked. But do such 
revelations tend to legitimize or delegitimize legal power? 
In Part IV, I conclude by offering some thoughts about the differ-
ences between the magical and legal contexts, and about how the ritual 
unmasking of doctrinal indeterminacy affects law’s legitimacy. 
I. THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
There may be no legal term in as widespread usage as proximate 
cause that has been as excoriated as it has. 
—Restatement (Third) of Torts
27
 
The language of proximate cause is remarkably resilient. For over a 
hundred years, lawyers, judges, and juries have analyzed whether a de-
fendant’s negligent conduct was the “proximate cause” of a plaintiff’s 
injury (and so a source of liability) based on the “foreseeability” of the 
injury, or its “direct,” “natural,” or “continuous” connection with the 
negligence. For nearly as long, these doctrinal tests, and the term “prox-
imate cause” itself, have been criticized as irrational and confusing.28 
Over the years, there have been many highly developed attempts to clari-
fy proximate cause doctrines and to rationalize them as determinate tests 
of liability.
29 
All these Herculean efforts have failed.
30
 Generations of 
respected critics have argued that doctrinal proximate cause is simply 
beside the point, or worse, that it obscures and interferes with whatever 
evaluative analysis actually does, or should, determine liability.
31 
Wheth-
  
 27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters’ 
note cmt. b (2010). 
 28. Empirical studies indicate that jurors often think they have been asked to determine 
whether a defendant’s act was the “approximate” cause of the plaintiff’s harm. See Robert P. Char-
row & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury 
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1353 (1979) (finding almost one-fourth of subjects misun-
derstood instruction on proximate cause in this fashion); see also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING 
JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 744 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that treating scope of 
liability as a matter of proximate cause “prevents clarity of thought and meaningful analysis”); 
JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE 6 (2003) (describing proximate cause as a “cryptic 
expression”); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 106–08 
(1911) (collecting critiques of proximate cause usage and characterizing it as the source of “infinite 
confusion and error”). 
 29. See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633, 
636 (1920); Grady, supra note 21, at 293–94; HART & HONORÉ, supra note 21. 
 30. “Modern tort theorists have lavished seemingly boundless attention on the problem of 
explaining proximate cause, but the consensus of law students and others is that proximate cause 
remains a hopeless riddle.” Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, 
and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 49–50 (1991). 
 31. See GREEN, supra note 22, at 76–77; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON 
TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special note 
(2010); Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning “Legal Cause” at Common Law, 9 
COLUM. L. REV. 16, 36 (1909); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. 
L. REV. 543, 544 (1962); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked 
Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 
1011 (1988). 
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er they view negligence liability as based on unexamined personal pref-
erences or a rational application of social and economic policies, most 
analysts agree that the doctrinal approach to proximate cause cannot pro-
duce predictable results. There have been three Restatements of Torts, 
and not one of them has embraced the traditional language of proximate 
cause.
32
 Yet the doctrines endure. And instead of displacing the doc-
trines, the criticisms appear in some of the same cases that deploy doctri-
nal analysis. 
A. Proximate Cause Doctrines: Foreseeability and Continuity 
Most courts adjudicating negligence claims involving harm per-
ceived to be in some way extraordinary engage in doctrinal proximate 
cause analysis.
33
 They apply some combination of two standard doctrinal 
tests that purport to determine when a defendant is still liable to the 
plaintiff for the injuries despite the unusual way the defendant’s action 
contributed to the plaintiff’s harm, or the unusual type or amount of 
harm. Commentators generally agree that standard doctrinal proximate 
cause covers two traditional doctrines: foreseeability and direct continui-
ty.
34
 Courts analyze and describe the causal connections and remedial 
ramifications of defendants’ conduct by analyzing (1) the foreseeability 
of the plaintiff’s injury and (2) the extent to which the injury was the 
direct, continuous, or natural result of the defendant’s risky behavior, or 
whether other factors “intervened” to “break the causal chain.”35 For 
  
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 (2010) (“An actor’s liabil-
ity is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of 
harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is 
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has 
resulted in the harm.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (1934). The most recent Restatement 
expresses some frustrated wonder at this state of affairs: 
Although the term “proximate cause” has been in widespread use in judicial opinions, 
treatises, casebooks, and scholarship, the term is not generally employed in this Chapter 
because it is an especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected. See § 29 
comment b. Hence, this Chapter is entitled, “Scope of Liability.” . . . Nevertheless, to 
communicate clearly with judges, lawyers, and academics who understand limitations on 
liability under the proximate-cause rubric, the term is included in a parenthetical follow-
ing the Chapter’s title. The Institute fervently hopes that the Restatement Fourth of Torts 
will not find this parenthetical necessary. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 6 special Note (2010). 
 33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f (2010); Patrick 
J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and 
the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2001). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters’ note cmt. b, 
(2010); Kelley, supra note 30, at 52; Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of 
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 996 (2001).  
 35. See Kellogg v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 26 Wis. 223, 253–54 (1870); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 reporters’ note cmt. b (2010); Kelley, supra note 30, at 52; 
Kelley, supra note 33. Most commentators frame the tests as “foreseeability” and “directness,” or 
“direct connection,” or “direct consequences.” Most commentators also seem to segregate “natural 
and continuous” from “direct”; perhaps viewing foreseeability and directness as two different gloss-
es on the more general “natural and continuous” analysis. I read “natural and continuous” and “di-
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instance, in a famous case from 1968 that still appears in the proximate 
cause chapter of torts casebooks,
36
 the Second Circuit concluded that 
“recovery was properly denied on the facts of this case because the inju-
ries . . . were too ‘remote’ or ‘indirect’ a consequence of defendants’ 
negligence.”37 
Judges generally articulate the proximate cause issue as a factual 
question, and most standard jury instructions have a section on proximate 
cause that draws on one or both of the doctrines of foreseeability and 
direct connection.
38
 So, for instance, the New York pattern jury instruc-
tions explain, “If you find that a reasonably prudent person would not 
have foreseen an act of the kind committed by [a third person] as a prob-
able consequence of the defendant’s negligence, then the defendant is not 
responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries and plaintiff may not recover.”39 
Alternatively, the Florida jury instruction counsels, “Negligence is a le-
gal cause of [injury] if it directly and in natural and continuous sequence 
produces or contributes substantially to producing such [injury], so that it 
can reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the [injury] would not 
have occurred.”40  
Some commentators identify a historical trend in which courts have 
shifted away from the direct continuity test to focus on foreseeability.
41
 
For example, Jane Stapleton explains that “[h]istorically . . . there have 
been two alternative general rules . . . . The directness rule extends to all 
outcomes, even if not foreseeable, so long as they are the ‘direct’ result 
of the tortious conduct. The more popular modern rule is that of foresee-
ability: freakish, ‘unforeseeable’ outcomes are outside the scope of liabil-
ity.”42 Although this comment might suggest that the shift to foreseeabil-
ity represents some form of rationalizing progress, and a narrowing of 
liability, Stapleton herself points out that it is widely recognized that in 
  
rect” as two ways of stressing the concept of continuous events, and “foreseeable” and “probable” as 
expressing the concept of imaginable events. 
 36. See, e.g., VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 442–
43 (3d ed. 2005); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 322 (2004). 
 37. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. b. (2010). 
 39. New York Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil 2:72 (3d ed. 2012).  
 40. Florida Standard Jury Instructions: Civil CLE 4-1 § 401.12(a) (2010).  
 41. See, e.g., Deanna Pollard Sacks, Constitutionalized Negligence, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1065, 1131 (2012) (“Foreseeability of harm is the cornerstone of modern proximate cause analy-
sis.”); Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1241, 1278 & n.220 (2011) (“Today, almost all states use either the foreseeability test or the 
scope of the risk test,” which “essentially ask the same question,” whereas previously “[t]he most 
common test was the directness test.”); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules & Immuni-
ty: An Application to Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007) (stating that previously courts fo-
cused on intervention that broke the chain of causation, but “[m]ore modern cases tend to rely on the 
general concept of foreseeability”). 
 42. Stapleton, supra note 34. 
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many cases either test will generate “or can be made to produce” the 
same result.
43
  
When one looks at the cases, conceptual and chronological separa-
tions between the two doctrines break down.
44
 Many judicial opinions—
both early and recent—combine the concepts of direct continuity and 
foreseeability as two aspects of the proximate cause analysis.
45
 In fact, 
since courts began discussing proximate cause, they have employed both 
direct continuity and foreseeability and complained about both. For in-
stance, in 1876 the United States Supreme Court explained: 
The question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between 
the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation? Did the facts 
constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to 
make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause 
intervening between the wrong and the injury? . . . [I]n order to war-
rant a finding that negligence . . . is the proximate cause of an injury, 
it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable conse-
quence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have 
been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.
46
 
This nineteenth century case thus effectively combines foreseeabil-
ity with the test of continuity.
47
 Rather than an alternative or limitation to 
the standard of direct continuity, in this approach foreseeability is part of 
what defines direct connection.
48
 
  
 43. Id. (“[I]t is widely acknowledged that in practice both approaches produce, or can be 
made to produce, the same results . . . .” (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 264 (1999); Kelley, 
supra note 30, at 52, 94; William J. Powers, Reputology, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1941, 1948 (1991)). 
 44. So, for instance, in another case classically included in torts casebooks, Judge Henry 
Friendly explained: “The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to 
consequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are ‘direct,’ 
and the damage, although other and greater than expected, is of the same general sort that was 
risked.” In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Linder v. Bidner, 270 
N.Y.S.2d 427, 429–30 (App. Div. 1966); JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 36, at 439–40; GOLDBERG, 
SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 311–20. 
 45. See, e.g., Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876); Williamson v. 
Liptzin, 539 S.E.2d 313, 319–20 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“Foreseeability is but one element of proxi-
mate cause . . . . Other equally important considerations include . . . whether there is a direct connec-
tion without intervening causes . . . .” (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 46. Kellogg, 94 U.S. at 475. 
 47. Id. at 474. 
 48. Many old cases combine foreseeability and direct connection in their proximate cause 
analyses. See, e.g., Harris v. Union Pac. Ry., 13 F. 591, 592 (C.C.D. Colo. 1882) (“Proximate cause 
. . . must [be] the natural and ordinary result of the cause; or, in other words, the question here may 
be stated to be whether a reasonably prudent and cautious person ought to have apprehended that the 
injury might result from the act which was done.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ultima Thule 
v. Benton, 110 S.W. 1037, 1038 (Ark. 1908) (“It is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding 
that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and 
probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in 
the light of the attending circumstances.” (quoting and adopting Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v. 
Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kleinberg v. Lyons, 148 S.E. 
535, 539 (Ga. 1929) (“[I]n order to hold the defendant liable, the evidence must show either that the 
act of the defendant complained of was the sole occasion of the injury, or that it put in operation 
other causal forces, such as were the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the original act, or 
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Although the modern cases often talk more about foreseeability, 
they typically still mix that concept with the idea of unbroken continuity, 
as courts have been doing for a very long time.
49
 In recent cases, con-
cepts of direct connection and unbroken causal chains remain active.
50
 
Foreseeability has received more attention from academics in recent 
years and is often presented as a rationalizing improvement that is gradu-
  
that the intervening agency could have reasonably been anticipated or foreseen by the original 
wrongdoer.”); Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 167 N.E. 235, 243 (Mass. 1929) (“The injury 
must be the direct result of the wrongful act. By direct and proximate cause is not meant that the 
cause of agency which is nearest in time or place to the result is necessarily to be chosen. It will not 
be considered too remote if, according to human experience, the defendant ought to have foreseen 
that the intervening act was likely to happen.”); Lane v. Atlanta Works, 111 Mass. 136, 139–40 
(1872) (“The act of a third person, intervening and contributing a condition necessary to the injuri-
ous effect or the original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if such act ought to have 
been foreseen. The original negligence still remains a culpable and direct cause of the injury.”); 
Galveston v. Sweeney, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 173, 178 (1894) (“‘[P]roximate cause’ is . . . such an act, 
wanting in ordinary care, as actively aided in producing the injury, as a direct and existing cause. It 
need not necessarily be the last or sole cause, but it must be a concurring cause, such as might rea-
sonably have been contemplated as involving the result, under the attending circumstances.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Jarosh v. Van Meter, 105 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Neb. 1960) (“To constitute proxi-
mate cause, . . . the injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligence, and be of such a 
character as an ordinarily prudent person could have known, or would or ought to have foreseen 
might probably occur as the result.” (quoting Steenbock v. Omaha Cnty. Club, 195 N.W. 117, 118 
(Neb. 1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Welsh v. Zuck, 218 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Neb. 1974) 
(“[A] person is not legally responsible for an injury if it would not have resulted but for the interpo-
sition of an efficient intervening cause, which he should not have reasonably anticipated.”); Wyatt v. 
Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“Foreseeability is only one element of proxi-
mate cause, [others include] whether the cause is . . . likely to produce the result; whether the rela-
tionship between cause and effect is too attenuated; whether there is a direct connection without 
intervening causes; . . . and whether there was a . . . continuous sequence between the cause and the 
result.”); Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 263–64 (Okla. 1982) (“The general 
rule is that the causal connection between an act of negligence and an injury is broken by the inter-
vention of a new, independent and efficient cause which was neither anticipated nor reasonably 
foreseeable.”); Medina v. Air-Mite Devices, Inc., 515 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“The 
causal connection between the defective product and the injury will only be broken if the intervening 
acts or omissions of a third party are improbable or unforeseeable, and, thus, superseding.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Duphily v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828–29 (Del. 1995) (“[A] 
proximate cause is one ‘which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient inter-
vening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.’ . . . The 
mere occurrence of an intervening cause . . . does not automatically break the chain of causation . . . . 
In order to break the causal chain, the intervening cause must also be a superseding cause, that is, the 
intervening act or event itself must have been neither anticipated nor reasonably foreseeable by the 
original tortfeasor.” (quoting Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094,1097 (Del. 1990))); Gibbs v. Her-
nandez, 810 So. 2d 1034, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (blending a “natural, direct and continuous 
sequence” requirement with foreseeability); Hassan v. Begley, 836 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (“The key to determining whether an intervening agency has broken the original chain of 
causation is to determine whether, under the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
agency would intervene in such a way as to cause the resulting injury.”); Edwards ex rel. Fryover v. 
Anderson Eng’g, Inc., 251 P.3d 660, 665 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he acts or omissions of these 
defendants were entirely ‘too attenuated’ to be a usual, likely, or legally cognizable cause of [the 
plaintiff’s] fatal injuries. . . . [N]egligent acts of others . . . broke the connection between the initial 
negligent acts and the harm caused. . . . These intervening acts or consequences cannot be said to be 
foreseeable.”); Crowe v. Shaw, 755 A.2d 509, 512 (Me. 2000) (finding that proximate cause may be 
proven if “the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
the negligence”); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Caputo, 710 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“Prox-
imate cause is an act or failure to act, which in the natural and continuous sequence directly produces 
the damage, and without which it would not have occurred. Cause occurs when the damage is the 
natural and foreseeable result of the act or failure to act.”). 
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ally displacing “an even vaguer and more amorphous limit on liability.”51 
But the history is much more troubled, mixing doctrines of continuity 
and foreseeability with critiques of both. 
B. Critiques of Proximate Cause 
Alongside the continued use of proximate cause doctrines, skepti-
cism abides. And just as the tests of directness and foreseeability do not 
fit readily into a narrative of progress, longstanding criticism has failed 
to generate a developmental shift away from doctrinal proximate cause 
analysis. Rather than displacing doctrine, the critiques coexist. Some-
times the conflict between doctrine and skepticism is presented as an 
argument between courts and the academy.
52
 But that division fails to 
capture the extent to which the application and critique of doctrine in-
termingle and thrive alongside one another. Academics rationalize the 
doctrines they critique, and judges have long recognized and acknowl-
edged that doctrinal proximate cause analyses are problematic.
53
  
There is an astonishingly broad consensus that the standard doctri-
nal inquiries are deeply flawed to the point of disutility. Moreover, criti-
cism of proximate cause is nearly as old as the doctrines.
54
 There are two 
primary critiques: (1) the doctrines are indeterminate; and (2) doctrinal 
proximate cause mixes empirical and normative analysis (and tends to 
obscure the normative part). These two main criticisms had crystallized 
  
 51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM, § 29 cmt. e (2010). 
 52. “No subject separates torts scholars from practitioners more than proximate cause.” Rich-
ard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles Statement, and Products Liability, 
53 S. C. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2002). 
 53. See, e.g., Am. Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Urbanski, 162 F. 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1908) (“The 
question of proximate cause is likely to lead us into undue refinements and subtlety of disquisition, if 
we do not guard ourselves therefrom, by taking a common sense view point from which to consider 
the happenings of ordinary and everyday life. The varying circumstances of each particular case 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule, or establish any test, by which the 
legal proximate cause of an event may be distinguished from the remote cause that is outside of legal 
cognizance.”); Evansville Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Claybon, 73 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind. App. 1947) 
(“[P]roximate cause is considered an issue of fact although its determination sometimes requires the 
application of difficult and obtuse rules of law.”); Hoover v. Wagner, 189 So. 2d 20, 27 (La. Ct. 
App. 1966) (“[T]he various definitions and tests of proximate cause are inadequate to afford a defi-
nite and invariable rule whereby a line can be drawn between those causes which the law regards as 
sufficiently proximate and those which are too remote . . . .”); Lewis v. Flint & P.M. Ry., 19 N.W. 
744, 748 (Mich. 1884) (“The application of the rule that the proximate and not the remote cause is to 
be regarded, is obscure and difficult in many cases, but not in this.”); White v. Diaz, 854 N.Y.S.2d 
106, 106 (App. Div. 2008) (“The resolution of proximate cause issues has been troubling courts and 
legal scholars for centuries . . . .”); Fannin v. Cubric, 255 N.E.2d 270, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) 
(“The term, ‘proximate cause,’ is often difficult of exact definition as applied to the facts of a partic-
ular case.”); Huffman v. Sorenson, 76 S.E.2d 183, 186 (Va. 1953) (“Proximate cause is a concept 
difficult to define and almost impossible to explain conclusively. Each case necessarily must be 
decided upon its own facts and circumstances.”); Scobba v. City of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 810 
(Wash. 1948) (“Making [a proximate cause] determination is something like drawing ‘a line between 
night and day.’”). 
 54. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 31, at 25 (arguing that any question beyond the initial but-
for causation question is not a causal question at all and formulating that question in causal terms is 
misleading because “[i]t naturally induces misapprehension that the inquiry in any concrete instance 
concerns only some subtle distinction between different kinds of causes in the ‘chain of causation’”). 
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by at least the 1920s in the writings of the legal realists, although proxi-
mate cause doctrines were questioned long before that time.
55
 The cri-
tiques are radical. Many analysts assert directly that foreseeability and 
continuity have little or nothing to do with the social, economic, and 
moral values that actually do, or should, determine negligence liability. 
Despite their apparent conflict, both the doctrines and criticism of prox-
imate cause remain central to tort theory. 
The most recent serious attempt to reform proximate cause language 
in negligence law came in 2010 with the publication of the first volume 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a definitionally mainstream source of 
tort commentary.
56
 Eschewing the term proximate cause, the Restatement 
reporters proposed assessing the “scope of liability”57 under a “risk 
standard”58 they deem superior to the traditional tests of direct continuity, 
broken and unbroken causal chains, and foreseeability that they 
acknowledge most judges and juries still undertake.
59
  
It was the legal realists, who in the 1920s and 1930s put forward the 
most direct and sustained critiques of proximate cause, pointing to the 
flexibility of doctrinal tests and suggesting alternative, overtly value-
laden approaches for balancing policy considerations regarding liabil-
ity.
60
 The realists argued that neither direct continuity nor foreseeabil-
ity—and for that matter no test involving “cause” in the usual sense of 
the word—could account for the liability outcomes in cases where courts 
  
 55. GREEN, supra note 22, at 76–77. 
 56. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS ch. 6 (2010). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. d (2010) (“Central to 
the limitation on liability of this Section is the idea that an actor should be held liable only for harm 
that was among the potential harms—the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious. The term 
‘scope of liability’ is employed to distinguish those harms that fall within this standard and, thus, for 
which the defendant is subject to liability.”). 
 58. Id. (“[T]he jury should be told that, in deciding whether plaintiff’s harm is within the 
scope of liability, it should go back to the reasons for finding the defendant engaged in negligent or 
other tortious conduct. If the harms risked by that tortious conduct include the general sort of harm 
suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is subject to liability for the plaintiff’s harm. . . . The standard 
imposed by this Section is often referred to as the requirement that the harm be ‘within the scope of 
the risk.’ . . . For the sake of convenience, this limitation on liability is referred to in the remainder of 
this Chapter as the ‘risk standard.’”). 
 59. Id. at § 29 cmt. e (“Currently, virtually all jurisdictions employ a foreseeability (or risk) 
standard for some range of scope-of-liability issues in negligence cases. When properly understood 
and framed, the foreseeability standard is congruent with the risk standard . . . . At least some courts 
have employed language that veers closer to the formulation of the risk standard provided in this 
Section than does a foreseeability test. . . . The primary alternative rule to the risk standard for limit-
ing a tortfeasor’s liability is the direct-consequences test.”). 
 60. Critiques of proximate cause go back even farther. In 1870, Nicholas St. John Green, one 
of Holmes’s colleagues on the Harvard faculty, attacked the direct continuity doctrine as a “danger-
ous metaphor.” NICHOLAS ST. JOHN GREEN, Proximate and Remote Cause, in ESSAYS AND NOTES 
ON THE LAW OF TORT AND CRIME 124 (1933) [1870], reprinted in 5 KAN. CITY L. REV. 114, 124 
(1937). For St. John Green, the notion of a continuous causal “chain” was a “pure fabrication of the 
mind.” Id. He pointed out that the idea of a sequence of individual causes linking each to each did 
not correspond to the way the world actually worked, and that in order to maintain that fiction, 
courts were relegating some actual causes to the status of background “conditions.” Id. at 125. His 
solution, however, was itself doctrinal—he advocated the foreseeability doctrine. Id. at 129.  
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talked about proximate cause. In an early influential article, Henry 
Edgerton criticized both direct continuity and foreseeability as ambigu-
ous.
61
 Edgerton saw these concepts as simply too flexible to meaningful-
ly restrain a judge’s liability analysis.62 Regarding “direct” cause, Edger-
ton asked, “Is not directness a matter of degree?” Answering his own 
question, he explained: 
In most cases . . . the connection between the defendant’s act and the 
plaintiff’s injury may well be regarded . . . as involving a single step, 
or as involving several steps. The question is simply how far one’s 
taste will take him in the subdivision of what is indefinitely, or infi-
nitely, subdivisible. Tastes differ.
63
 
Edgerton recognized foreseeability as a similarly plastic concept: 
Is the “foreseen danger” a danger of the intervention of the identical 
force which does intervene, or is it enough if there is danger of the 
intervention of a force of similar character; and if the latter, how 
closely similar must it be?
64
 
Thus, the basic indeterminacy of doctrinal proximate cause, which be-
devils judges, academics, and law students to this day, was fully articu-
lated over eighty years ago. 
The most tenacious realist critic of proximate cause was Leon 
Green. As far as he was concerned, doctrinal analysis of foreseeability 
and direct continuity ignored the policy questions judges should and did 
consider in negligence cases.
65
 The term “cause” properly referred to 
only a narrow range of empirical questions and not to the normative is-
sues of responsibility that proximate cause analysis usually included.
66
 
According to Green, judges’ resort to “metaphysical” doctrinal reasoning 
in such cases covered up what were really judicial determinations of 
“public policy, a balancing of interests, with the conclusion that it is bet-
ter to deny protection to the interest involved under such circumstances 
than it is to undertake to give compensation under all the difficulties of 
the case.”67 The real question was the “scope of protection” of the legal 
  
 61. See generally Edgerton, supra note 22 passim. 
 62. Id. at 211. 
 63. Id. at 215. 
 64. Id. at 231. 
 65. Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C. L. REV. 3, 3, 20 
(1927) (“The attempt which common law courts have made to resolve every major problem of legal 
liability in tort into terms of causal relation marks the most glaring and persistent fallacy in tort 
law.”); see also GREEN, supra note 22, at 76–77; Kelley, supra note 30, at 98 (citing LEON GREEN, 
JUDGE AND JURY 265–67 (1930)). 
 66. GREEN, supra note 22, at 2–5 (“[T]he abortive efforts which have been made to solve the 
inquiries of prime importance in terms of causal connection cannot be exaggerated. The deplorable 
expenditure and stupendous waste of judicial energy which has been employed in converting this 
simple problem into an insoluble riddle beggars description.”). 
 67. Leon Green, Causal Relation in Legal Liability–In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 513, 532 (1927) 
(citations omitted). 
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rule or norms on which the claim was based.
68
 That policy determination 
had nothing to do with cause or with metaphorical connections between 
plaintiff and defendant, whether articulated in terms of direct causal 
chains or foreseeability: “This problem, however phrased, is one of bal-
ancing of interests.”69 
To Green, proximate cause was pure illusion—a fallacy that ob-
scured or displaced the real analyses that courts should and did make. 
“[T]he myth of ‘proximate cause,’” he said, “finds its only rivals in those 
of theological origin.”70 Courts were using these “fantastic” doctrines to 
“do . . . under the guise of ‘proximate cause’ what should have been done 
by way of defining the scope of protection” the law provided, an analysis 
that was properly conducted by overtly balancing a number of different 
policy concerns.
71
 
Green did not pull punches. Courts’ focus on foreseeability in prox-
imate cause determinations was “stupid” because it repeated a test al-
ready used to determine negligence in the first place.
72
 The “confused” 
doctrinal approach was a “wretched” approach to liability “inexcusably 
perpetrated by intelligent judges and utterly devoid of scientific founda-
tion.”73 Their “use of all those weighted phrases as ‘remote,’ ‘unfore-
seen,’ ‘intervening agencies,’ ‘independent agencies,’ and a score of oth-
ers” were “meaningless as solvents” and only functioned to “provide a 
smoke screen behind which the court can retire from an awkward posi-
tion.”74 
For the realists, then, doctrinal determinacy was simply false—a 
fraud or a fantasy. They were (mostly) willing to do away with it in favor 
of a more overt and rational version of what they believed judges were 
really doing anyway, namely policy analysis. Green offered a list of fac-
tors for courts to consider when deciding negligence liability, and 
acknowledged that the ultimate balance a court would strike would de-
pend on judges’ individual points of view.75 Edgerton embraced indefi-
niteness as a necessary reality of what he saw as an individual decision-
  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. GREEN, supra note 22, at 136. Green’s arguments are wonderfully free of the kind of 
academic circumspection that characterizes so much legal academic prose today. In another bracing-
ly direct description, he called proximate cause “a bogey, the sort of thing found only in children’s 
story books—a sort of child’s mind creation.” Id. at v. 
 71. Id. at 77; see also Green, supra note 11, at 1034 (listing and discussing the five factors 
that should be overtly balanced—administrative, ethical or moral, economic, prophylactic, and 
justice—and discussing the administrative factor). See generally Leon Green, The Duty Problem in 
Negligence Cases, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 255–84 (1929) (discussing the remaining four factors). 
 72. GREEN, supra note 22, at 76. 
 73. Id. at 77. 
 74. Id. at 76–77. 
 75. Green, supra note 11, at 1034 (listing and discussing the five factors that should be overt-
ly balanced—administrative, ethical or moral, economic, prophylactic, and justice—and discussing 
the administrative factor). 
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making process.
76
 He was prepared to rely on judicial “intuition” and 
“instinct” as the best available methods of legal analysis.77 
Of course, there is a tremendous price to pay for such a shift. Mov-
ing from doctrine to policy means giving up on the central legal concept 
of decisions produced by something other than the decision maker’s con-
scious choice. It means accepting decision making that, however well 
reasoned, is the result of exactly those kinds of deliberate choices. No 
wonder, then, that many legal decision makers and scholars today em-
brace the realist view of doctrinal indeterminacy but are unwilling to 
accept the realist solution of replacing doctrinal analysis with straight-
forward policy reasoning.
78
 
Certainly there are serious jurists and commentators who do not 
share the realist view of doctrinal indeterminacy in general. Regarding 
proximate cause, however, there are few serious rebuttals.
79
 Yet despite 
near universal agreement that proximate cause doctrines are empty, many 
judges and law professors continue to proceed as if those doctrines were 
capable of determining, or at least contributing meaningfully to, legal 
outcomes that are then subjected to realist criticism. Often, a doctrinal 
analysis is followed by questions about whether the results of that analy-
sis fit with the equities in the particular case and broader policy consider-
ations. Indeed, these days the unspoken view often seems to be that doc-
trinal formulas constitute the basic method for legal decision making, 
producing inchoate results that are augmented and completed by the de-
cision maker’s policy analysis.80 Where doctrines are acknowledged to 
be indeterminate, however, this is problematic.  
  
 76. Edgerton, supra note 22. 
 77. Id. at 242–43 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 
940, 951–52, 956–57 (1923)). 
 78. But note that even the original realists did not always follow their prescriptions. Jerome 
Frank, for instance, served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where his 
judicial opinions sometimes deride legal doctrines and rules. See, e.g., United States v. Rubenstein, 
151 F.2d 915, 923 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur legal concepts often resemble the 
necks of the flamingos in Alice in Wonderland which failed to remain sufficiently rigid to be used 
effectively as mallets by the croquet-players.”). Nonetheless, many of his opinions blend doctrine 
and policy. See, e.g., Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 106–12 (2d Cir. 1954) 
(Frank, J., dissenting) (engaging in traditional doctrinal proximate cause analysis, though asserting 
that “[n]o foggier phrase . . . could be contrived for use in negligence cases,” and upon finding injury 
was foreseeable, adding a policy-based argument to find it unconscionable to allow manufacturers to 
escape liability on grounds of a threat to free trade or undue liability burdens). 
 79. Indeed proximate cause is sometimes used as an object lesson for students about the 
extent of doctrinal indeterminacy. For instance, one longtime torts professor told me that she always 
brings her crystal ball to class when she teaches proximate cause. 
 80. See TAMANAHA, supra note 7; L.H. Larue, “Neither Force Nor Will,” 12 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 179, 181 (1995) (“[N]one of us believes that our judges are ‘bound 
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular 
case that comes before them.’” (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max 
Beloff ed., 1987)); W. Bradley Wendel, Jurisprudence and Judicial Ethics 1 (Cornell Law Faculty 
Publ’ns. Paper 96, 2007), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/96 (“American lawyers and 
judges do not regard it as improper to rely on ‘policy’ arguments, which are, in effect, middle-level 
principles of political morality that play a role in justifying legal decisions.”); Felix Frankfurter, 
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In the case of proximate cause, doctrines of foreseeability and direct 
connection are simply too malleable to determine a result—initial or fi-
nal—in a particular factual legal problem.81 Shifting doctrinal reasoning 
to the first step in a purported combination doctrine–policy analysis thus 
fails to add any meaningful constraint on the ultimate decision. Indeter-
minate doctrines cannot furnish an initial result to be tweaked by policy 
any more than they can furnish the final liability determination. Moreo-
ver, even assuming that doctrine and policy theoretically could be mixed 
with integrity, the fact remains that most judges express their decisions 
almost entirely in terms of doctrine even when, as in Derdiarian v. Felix 
Contracting Corp.,
82
 they acknowledge that policy must play a role.
83
 
Indeed, proximate cause is the rare doctrinal area where judges openly 
acknowledge that policy plays a role.
84
 At the very least, this suggests 
that many, if not most, judicial practitioners view the mixture of policy 
and doctrine as problematic, even when they are willing to assert its ne-
cessity.  
C. Proximate Cause Case Law’s Intermittent Combination of Doctrine 
and Critique 
Courts continue to engage in doctrinal proximate cause analysis. 
From time to time, though, in the midst of that analysis, judges point to 
proximate cause doctrines’ inability to determine liability. Again, this is 
not a new or even a post-realist phenomenon. In 1876, the U.S. Supreme 
Court referred to the “embarrassing question” of proximate cause and 
acknowledged “that the rule is difficult of application.”85 A hundred 
years later, in Derdiarian, the New York court was even more direct: 
  
Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 905 (1953) (noting that judges must bear “alle-
giance to nothing except the effort to find their path through precedent, through policy, through 
history, . . . to the best judgment”); James D. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of 
Law, 37 BROOK. L. REV. 323, 333–34 (1971) (arguing that judges will use public policy to decide 
cases and advocating that judges’ remain candid and clear when they do so). 
 81. Examples of cases in which doctrines do appear to determine results often involve obvi-
ous quantitative questions (e.g., whether a deadline has expired). See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United 
States, 223 F.3d. 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000). Though even here there are always equitable arguments 
available that the deadline should not apply in this particular case and legal interpretive arguments 
that the text that codifies the deadline was not “intended” to apply in such cases. 
 82. 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980). 
 83. Id. at 670; see also Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 19 (N.J. 1997); Scobba v. City 
of Seattle, 198 P.2d 805, 810 (Wash. 1948). 
 84. See, e.g., Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Proximate 
cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to extend liability for 
a defendant’s actions.”); Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372, 375 (Cal. 1945) (Traynor, J., 
concurring) (“‘[P]roximate cause’ . . . is ordinarily concerned . . . with the various considerations of 
policy that limit an actor’s responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.”); Fandrey ex rel. 
Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W. 345, 360–61 (Wis. 2004) (concluding that recovery 
was out of proportion to the culpability of the defendant homeowners and would place an unreason-
able burden on similarly situated tortfeasors); Martinez v. Lazaroff, 411 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (App. 
Div. 1978) (explaining that proximate cause serves to place reasonable limits on the liability of an 
actor as a matter of public policy to avoid burdening human activity in ways that would do little to 
prevent freakish accidents). 
 85. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474–75 (1876). 
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“The concept of proximate cause, or more appropriately legal cause, has 
proven to be an elusive one, incapable of being precisely defined to cov-
er all situations.”86 
Indeed, the Derdiarian court expressly invoked the view that prox-
imate cause stands in for judicial policy making, explaining that the doc-
trine’s “elusive[ness]” is, “in part, because the concept stems from policy 
considerations that serve to place manageable limits upon the liability 
that flows from negligent conduct” and depending on the facts of the 
individual case, “a variety of factors may be relevant.”87 Note that the 
court first suggests that “policy considerations” are internal to doctrinal 
proximate cause analysis.
88
 So far, so good, because this is how doctrine 
and policy do fit together. The idea is that doctrine encapsulates policy 
choices and enforces those choices through tests that replace decision 
makers’ individual policy judgments. The problem comes in what fol-
lows: the court acknowledged that, as Henry Edgerton and Leon Green 
argued, in any given case the application of proximate cause doctrines 
depends on “a variety of factors.”89 Thus, individual policy judgments 
come back in as the judge decides which factors are relevant. Neverthe-
less, Derdiarian proceeded to a full-fledged doctrinal analysis. 
Derdiarian is still heavily cited in New York case law
90
 and includ-
ed in torts casebooks.
91
 The plaintiff was a workman injured at a street 
construction site. He sued his employer-contractor, claiming that the 
saw-horse-type barricade protecting the site was a negligently insuffi-
cient safety precaution.
92 
After reciting the bizarre facts—an epileptic 
driver lost consciousness and careened into the work area, hitting the 
plaintiff and a kettle of boiling hot liquid enamel, which splattered and 
ignited his body into a fire ball
93—the court proceeded to a doctrinal 
analysis that combines the concepts of foreseeability and unbroken con-
tinuity.
94
 Analyzing whether the epileptic driver’s seizure was “a super-
seding cause which interrupted the link between [the defendant contrac-
  
 86. Derdiarian, 414 N.E. 2d at 670. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Merino v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 675 N.E.2d 1222, 1222 (N.Y. 1996); Mirand 
v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994); Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 
912, 915–16 (N.Y. 1993); Kriz v. Schum, 549 N.E.2d 1155, 1159–61 (N.Y. 1989); Goldsmith Mo-
tors Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 838 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 2007); Soomaroo v. Mainco Elevator 
& Elec. Corp., 838 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (App. Div. 2007); Terry v. Danisi Fuel Oil Co., 837 N.Y.S.2d 
256, 257 (App. Div. 2007); Fordham-Coleman v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 834 N.Y.S.2d 422, 
427–28 (App. Div. 2007); Flynn v. Compton, 833 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (App. Div. 2007); Pierre v. 
Lieber, 829 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (App. Div. 2007). 
 91. See, e.g., JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 36, at 394–96; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., 
PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 336–38 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010).  
 92. Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d at 669. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 670–71. 
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tor’s] negligence and plaintiff’s injuries,”95 the court explained that “lia-
bility turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable 
consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence.”96 If 
the epileptic driver’s negligence in breaking through the barricade was 
“not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far 
removed from the defendant’s conduct,” it might be “a superseding act 
which breaks the causal nexus.”97 But the court declined to rule that a 
“superseding cause . . . interrupted the link between” the defendant’s 
negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries, reasoning that a jury could reason-
ably conclude “that the foreseeable, normal and natural result” of the 
defendant contractor’s negligent failure to provide better barricades “was 
the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly protected area.”98 
The application of Derdiarian’s doctrinal analysis in subsequent 
cases wholly confirms the view that proximate cause is an “elusive,” that 
is, indeterminate, concept.
99
 Consider two cases involving injuries caused 
by dives into shallow swimming pools. In Boltax v. Joy Day Camp,
100 
a 
twenty-year-old man who knew the depth of the water and was “knowl-
edgeable about the general dangers of diving” nevertheless dove head-
first from a lifeguard chair into the shallow end of a pool.
101
 He alleged 
that the defendant day camp that ran the pool knew young people were 
using the pool in the evenings and negligently continued to allow them to 
gain entrance to its pool with dangerously low water and a lifeguard’s 
chair at the shallow end.
102
 The court, quoting, inter alia, Derdiarian, 
dismissed the case.
103
 The plaintiff diver’s “reckless conduct” was an 
  
 95. Id. at 671. 
 96. Id. at 670. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 671. 
 99. See, for example, the following cases, each of which cites Derdiarian, and yet on argua-
bly similar facts produces opposite liability results, finding no proximate cause: Rodriguez v. Her-
nandez, 830 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781–82 (App. Div. 2007) (concluding that it was not foreseeable that 
such a crash was likely to occur where plaintiff driver lost control of his vehicle after collision 
caused him to crash into a shoddily built shed constructed by the city, one piece of which fell 
through the windshield and pierced plaintiff’s thigh); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fleury, No. 5:99-CV-1261, 
2007 WL 1200137, at *3–4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) (holding that defendant was not liable for 
damage resulting from a tree on defendant’s property touching power lines that caused an electric 
back feed setting fire to plaintiff’s home because defendant could not have reasonably foreseen such 
a result); Haughton v. T & J Elec. Corp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666–67 (App. Div. 2003) (upholding 
summary judgment for defendant university and electrical company, finding that the plaintiff 
handyman-employee was the proximate cause of his own injuries because checking a circuit box 
during a campus blackout without protective gear was an intervening act cutting off the university 
and company’s negligence in mislabeling live wires in the circuit box); Marenghi v. N.Y. City 
Transit Auth., 542 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543–44 (1989) (reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff who was 
injured when a New York City subway conductor re-opened the doors to allow a rushing commuter 
to board the train and knock over and injure the plaintiff, finding the rushing commuter’s actions an 
unforeseeable, superseding act and citing public-policy concerns).  
 100. 490 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1986). 
 101. Id. at 528. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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“unforeseeable superseding event,” said the court, that absolved the de-
fendant pool owners of liability in the accident.
104
  
Three years later, however, the same court allowed another pool 
case to go forward. In Kriz v. Schum,
105
 a teenage girl sued the manufac-
turers and distributors of a pool and pool slide, and the contractor who 
installed them both.
106
 The girl was told by the pool’s owner that it was 
safe to dive from the pool slide, which was set between the deep and 
shallow ends of the pool.
107
 Indeed, her host exhorted her to dive, in-
forming her that it was a “ritual” for everyone to enter the pool the first 
time by diving from the top of the slide.
108
 Moreover, the accident took 
place at night, the host had neglected to turn on the pool light, and the 
plaintiff had removed her contact lenses, so she could not see the depth 
of the water.
109
 The court rejected the slide manufacturer’s proximate 
cause argument, holding that the lack of posted warnings and the slide’s 
design and placement between the deep and shallow parts of the pool 
“were causative factors” in her injuries.110 This time, the court explained, 
again quoting Derdiarian, that “[i]n these circumstances, a superseding 
act does not break the causal nexus unless it is ‘an intervening act . . . 
extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal 
course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s 
conduct.’”111 The court noted the opposite result in Boltax, and acknowl-
edged that the host’s conduct here may have been reckless, but held that 
neither his conduct nor the plaintiff’s decision to take a blind dive into a 
dark, unfamiliar pool were “extraordinary and unforeseeable so as to 
break the causal chain.”112 
There are aspects of these cases that might make their results equi-
table, and even predictable, but they have nothing to do with foreseeabil-
ity or continuity. The Boltax plaintiff precluded from recovery was an 
adult man and a trespasser.
113
 Arguably his own fault in the accident 
would have made it unfair to tag the pool owner—a children’s day 
camp—with damages.114 The Kriz plaintiff was another story: a teenage 
girl pressured by another teenager to take a ridiculous risk. As between 
the girl who succumbed to peer pressure to do something stupid and the 
companies who built, sold, and installed the equipment that facilitated 
her unfortunate stunt, it was arguably fairer and more economically 
  
 104. Id. 
 105. 549 N.E.2d 1155 (N.Y. 1989). 
 106. Id. at 1158. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1160–61. 
 111. Id. at 1161 (quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1980)). 
 112. Id. at 1161. 
 113. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 493 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590 (App. Div. 1985). 
 114. Id. 
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sound to shift the cost to defendants who surely knew that accidents in-
volving their equipment would happen occasionally and nevertheless 
went on building and marketing pools and slides, and who could presum-
ably internalize the cost of liability by increasing their products’ costs.115  
It is not possible, however, to say that the relative foreseeability or 
directness of the accidents in Boltax and Kriz can account for their dis-
parate results.
116
 Whether the defendants could foresee what happened to 
the plaintiffs depends entirely on the level of generality at which one 
frames the events to be foreseen. Likewise, the directness of the connec-
tion between the plaintiffs’ injuries and defendants’ acts depends on 
framing rather than on a consistent analysis. Instead of doctrine internal-
izing certain values and determining the liability result accordingly, the 
tests of foreseeability and direct connection are so flexible that they in-
vite the decision maker to adjust the level of generality to make the lia-
bility result reflect the decision maker’s views about equity and the best 
social policies under the circumstances. As Edgerton observed eighty 
years earlier, whether one finds a direct connection between the defend-
ant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury in this type of case is a matter of 
“taste.”117 The New York pool cases are far from atypical in their use of 
proximate cause doctrines to reach results that seem utterly unpredictable 
on the basis of those doctrines. Indeed, as the Restatement reports, in 
jurisdictions across the country those doctrines continue to be employed 
in negligence cases to produce disparate results in apparently similar 
circumstances.
118
  
  
 115. Of course, this analysis is one basis for strict liability for product “defects.” 
 116. See sources cited supra note 99. 
 117. Edgerton, supra note 22, at 215. 
 118. Compare First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1073–74 (Ill. 
1999) (reversing jury verdict for plaintiff and finding defendant not the proximate cause of death of a 
student killed crossing the street mid-block where defendant had parked his tanker truck in a no-
parking zone very near a school just as it was letting out—blocking oncoming traffic’s view and 
partially blocking the driving lanes and pedestrian’s view of oncoming traffic—because the student’s 
jaywalking was the sole cause of the accident), with Biel v. City of Bridgeview, 781 N.E.2d 555, 
561–64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (reversing summary judgment for defendant city, where plaintiff’s 
decedent was struck and killed while jaywalking late at night, badly intoxicated, stumbling, and 
nearly senseless, but street lamps at the location were out and had been for some time, making it 
foreseeable that such injury could result). Compare Maroulis v. Elliott, 151 S.E.2d 339, 344–47 (Va. 
1966) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiffs where an accident began when a car driving in the wrong 
direction caused first car of the group to swerve off the shoulder, leading second car to collide at 
high speed with the car driving in the wrong direction and third car to brake to avoid hitting second 
car, but defendant driver of fourth car did not brake fast enough and slammed into the back of the 
second car and thus was the proximate cause of a substantial portion of the injuries), with Edlow v. 
Arnold, 415 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (Va. 1992) (affirming jury verdict for defendant where plaintiff 
traveling on an icy road stopped to pick up a passenger at an intersection and defendant’s car struck 
plaintiff’s car from the rear, and defendant testified that she saw the stopped car five to six car 
lengths ahead but did not apply the breaks until two car lengths away, despite the icy conditions). 
Compare Gardner v. City of San Jose, 57 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180–81 (Ct. App. 1967) (upholding jury 
verdict for the plaintiff because city had created a dangerous trap—whereby drivers would assume 
they had the right of way—by constructing but not properly maintaining a subterranean pedestrian 
walkway under a busy street, leading to it being poorly lit, smelling of urine, and covered in obscene 
graffiti, so that the plaintiff, a fifteen-year-old girl, rather than use the subterranean walkway, 
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So we are left with an even deeper puzzle than the one presented in 
the standard story. There is no real evidence of any rationalizing trend 
toward greater doctrinal clarity and predictability. Even courts that con-
tinue to rely on proximate cause doctrines acknowledge their indetermi-
nacy. And yet, proximate cause persists. 
II. THE MAGIC OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
No other formula has found so much affection in the chambers of fi-
nal authority; none other so nearly does the work of Aladdin’s lamp. 
—Leon Green
119
 
I want to pick up a cue from the realists who criticized proximate 
cause to suggest a new way to understand the doctrines’ mysterious resil-
ience. More than one realist observed that proximate cause doctrines 
were like a form of legal “magic” or “ritual.”120 I propose to take that 
comparison seriously. Using anthropological accounts from a variety of 
cultural contexts, I will sketch some ways in which legal doctrines, and 
particularly the doctrines of proximate cause, resemble magic practices. 
It might seem that uncovering connections between doctrine and magic 
would only confirm the critique of proximate cause as judicial fakery and 
add to the mystery of its longevity in the face of such criticism. But I will 
argue (in Part III below) that a particular shared feature of doctrine and 
magic may account for both practices’ staying power. Strangely, that 
common feature involves exposing the practices’ inability to produce 
independent results. Incorporating skepticism about proximate cause into 
judicial decisions that employ proximate cause doctrines resembles a 
technique of magic in other cultures—what anthropologist Michael 
Taussig calls “the skilled revelation of skilled concealment.”121 There is a 
double surprise here. First, the realists’ comparison of doctrine to “magic 
words” turns out to be accurate in more literal and complex ways than 
one might expect. Second, skeptical revelations perpetuate rather than 
destroy both magic and doctrine.  
A. The Realist Insight: Doctrinal Magic Language 
Leon Green’s comparison of negligence doctrines to ritual and mag-
ic is an example of a more general realist theme.
122
 Foundational realist 
  
crossed the street and was struck and severely injured), with Moritz v. City of Santa Clara, 87 Cal. 
Rptr. 675, 677–78 (Ct. App. 1970) (upholding summary judgment for city where a pedestrian struck 
by a vehicle in a crosswalk argued that the crosswalk, located between a parochial school and a 
shopping center, created a trap because it was marked as a school crossing so that after school hours 
drivers would assume they had the right of way).  
 119. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 471, 471–72 
(1950). 
 120. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11; Green, supra note 11, at 1016. 
 121. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222. 
 122. See generally Jessie Allen, Magical Realism, in LAW AND MAGIC 195, 195–208 (Christine 
Corcos ed., 2010); Allen, supra note 13, at 796–97. 
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texts criticize doctrinal reasoning, precedential reliance, and formal court 
procedures as a kind of illusionistic, legal magic.
123
 The realist descrip-
tion of the connections between law and magic generally has been dis-
missed as a rhetorical device. But the realists’ own writings make clear 
that they considered the affinity between adjudication and ritual magic a 
practical—and wholly corrupting—reality.124  
For Green, judges’ application of the proximate cause tests of direct 
connection and foreseeability was “a sort of necessary ritual.”125 More 
generally, Green attacked doctrinal reasoning as “legal theology which 
requires substituting a symbolic phrase . . . for the judgment required of a 
judge in giving or denying the protection of government to the interest 
involved.”126 Such doctrinal “[w]ord ritual,” he declared, “has always 
been one of the primary methods of law administration,”127 and “[w]e 
can scarcely realize the part which sacred words, taboo words, magic 
words, continue to play in our law.”128 Among Green’s realist contempo-
raries, Jerome Frank attacked doctrinal reasoning as a childish belief in 
the automatic oracular power of legal formulas, and Felix Cohen offered 
a list of doctrinal terms that functioned as “magic ‘solving words,’” in-
cluding proximate cause.
129
 
B. The Techniques of Legal Magic 
Following up the realist comparison of law and magic, I reviewed 
anthropological accounts of magic in other cultures and compared them 
with the structures of modern adjudication. In a previous article, I enu-
merated five such structural similarities that I called (1) enacting perfor-
mance, (2) heightened formality, (3) temporal play, (4) performativity, 
and (5) transformative analogy.
130
 
Very briefly, both adjudication and magic ritual transform reality 
through enacting performances, real-time rituals that aim to protect, re-
store, or change something about the prevailing social circumstances.
131
 
Like other rituals, adjudication’s performances (trials, hearings, sen-
tencings, etc.) are characterized by a formal structure that is unusually 
rigid (compared with other interactions in the surrounding society) and a 
rather transgressive approach to time. As in magic, the heightened for-
mality of law is not just ceremonial. Legal efficacy is bounded by formal 
  
 123. FRANK, supra note 11, at 12 (“legal myth”); Cohen, supra note 11 (“legal magic”); id. at 
820 (“magic solving words”); Green, supra note 11, at 1016 (“word ritual”). 
 124. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 809–11; id. at 820; FRANK, supra note 11, at 181–82; Green, 
supra note 11, at 1016. 
 125. Green, supra note 65, at 9. 
 126. Green, supra note 11, at 1030. 
 127. Id. at 1016. 
 128. Id. 
 129. FRANK, supra note 11, at 18–20; Cohen, supra note 11, at 820. 
 130. Allen, supra note 13, at 779–80. 
 131. Id. at 781–83. 
File: Issue1_Allen_FINAL_ToDarby_020913 Created on: 2/9/2013 10:41:00 PM Last Printed: 2/9/2013 10:51:00 PM 
2012] THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 101 
limits on time and place: for instance, a given piece of information may 
be centrally important in a legal decision or utterly beside the point, de-
pending on whether it is received by the decision makers in one or an-
other room in the courthouse, or on Tuesday instead of Monday.
132
 Yet, 
alongside rigid temporal restrictions on evidence, common law allows or 
even requires temporal play that ignores ordinary temporal limits. Judges 
transgress chronology to argue with or adopt judicial reasoning from 
long ago and treat the words of their precedential ancestors as though 
they had been spoken yesterday.
133
 The language of both legal doctrinal 
analysis and magic spells has a tendency to narrow the range of terms 
used and to imbue particular repeated words and sequences of words 
with multiple layers of meaning, condensed symbolic references, and 
associations to complex narratives that only practitioners recognize. 
Moreover, like magic spells, the words of judicial opinions are often 
structured as descriptions but distinguished by their performativity: they 
create the realities they describe.
134
 Finally, magical or legal performa-
tive speech acts often accomplish their work through transformative 
analogies that link legal cases or ritual enactments.
135
  
C. Proximate Cause’s Affinities with Ritual Magic 
1. Heightened Formality and Condensed Symbolic Meaning 
A comparison with anthropological studies confirms the realist in-
sight that doctrinal “word jugglery” has something in common with the 
formal language of magic spells. Bronislaw Malinowski’s early twenti-
eth-century study of the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea is a 
seminal work on magic.
136
 Analyzing the language of Trobriand magic, 
Malinowski noted that a spell’s words “are short, cutting, pithy expres-
sions, each standing for its own cycle of ideas, for a sentence or even a 
whole story.”137 Likewise, the realists describe doctrinal terms as con-
densing complex combinations of facts and evaluative judgments. These 
were Felix Cohen’s “magic ‘solving words,’” and “proximate cause” was 
one of them.
138
 Such terms, said Leon Green, are “designed to reduce to a 
single word a network of ideas.”139 
The terms of Trobriand magic are common words (or variants of 
common words) that have acquired additional ritual meanings. For in-
stance, the word “papapa” means “flutter” in ordinary Papuan usage, but 
  
 132. Id. at 783–84. 
 133. Id. at 787–88. 
 134. Id. at 784–87. 
 135. Id. at 789–92. 
 136. See BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC (Dutton & Co., 
Inc. ed., 1950) (1922). 
 137. Id. at 434. 
 138. Cohen, supra note 11, at 820 (internal quotations marks omitted) (providing other exam-
ples such as contract, property, fair value, and due process). 
 139. Green, supra note 11, at 1016 n.12. 
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when used in a canoe-magic spell the word stands for a phrase that refers 
to the special role of fluttering leaves in the decoration of canoes and 
evokes “native ideas about magical association between flutter and 
speed, and . . . the ritual use of pandanus streamers.”140 Such magical 
meanings are “intelligible only to those who are acquainted with the part 
played” by the words’ referents in the magic rituals themselves.141 The 
word has its full ritual meaning “only if taken with the context of this 
formula, in connection with its aim, with the various associated ideas and 
customs.”142 Another word in the same spell “is again an elaborate com-
pound carrying the meaning ‘to leave behind.’”143 In Malinowski’s con-
textual interpretation, “‘leaving behind’ undoubtedly refers to the other 
canoes which will be outrun by that of the reciter,” but this association is 
unspoken.
144
 Thus, each of these magical terms “stands alone and repre-
sents a self-contained cycle of ideas.”145 
Compare courts’ use of the term “proximate cause” and the associ-
ated doctrinal concepts and phrases: “superseding cause,” “foreseeable 
cause,” “intervening act,” and “break the causal chain.” Like the terms 
used in Trobriand canoe magic, these words and phrases have ordinary 
meanings that operate in their ritual use as well. In everyday usage, “pa-
papa” means “flutter” and “proximate” means “next” or “close.”146 But 
to the participants familiar with the use of these terms in magical and 
legal contexts, these words evoke different and more complex meanings, 
and condense whole statements and narratives in the context of those 
rituals.
147
 
  
 140. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 434–35. 
 141. Id. at 434. 
 142. Id. at 435. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. Similarly, Victor Turner observes that among the Ndembu people of South-Central 
Africa, important symbols that are used repeatedly as ritual focal points have “a ‘fan’ or ‘spectrum’ 
of referents, which are interlinked by what is usually a simple mode of association.” VICTOR 
TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 50 (1967). For example, the 
“mudyi,” or milk tree, exudes milky white sap, associated with breast feeding. It is the mythical 
location of the ancestress’s founding of the Ndembu people and the site of girls’ initiation rites. The 
tree thus connects the visceral, emotional experience of mother–infant intimacy with Ndembu matri-
lineal social structure. Id. at 20–22. For Turner, this combination of normative and sensory–
emotional content is a definitional property of ritual symbols that works to charge the values rituals 
prescribe with emotional associations. Id. at 28. 
 146. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1828 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S] (defining “proximate” as “very near,” “close,” “soon forthcoming,” or “next preceding 
or following”). 
 147. Besides the term “proximate cause” itself, traditional proximate cause analyses deploy a 
raft of terms that could be added to the realist list of “magic solving words.” Doctrinal analysis in 
general makes repeated use of words and phrases that have taken on a special meaning apart from 
their ordinary English usage to stand for a complex set of ideas and combine both factual and moral 
content. The magic words of proximate cause include “superseding cause,” “superseding event,” 
“superseding act,” “intervening act,” “independent intervening acts,” “independent superseding 
cause,” “direct cause,” “foreseeability,” “foreseeable,” “unforeseeable,” “foreseeable consequences,” 
“foreseeable risk,” “foreseeable cause,” “causal nexus,” “causal connection,” “causal chain,” and 
“chain of causation”—all of which appear, often repeatedly, in the cases. 
File: Issue1_Allen_FINAL_ToDarby_020913 Created on: 2/9/2013 10:41:00 PM Last Printed: 2/9/2013 10:51:00 PM 
2012] THE PERSISTENCE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 103 
Like a magician’s use of the word “flutter” in a Trobriand canoe 
spell, a judge’s statement that a defendant’s act was the proximate cause 
of a plaintiff’s harm both “stands alone and represents a self-contained 
cycle of ideas” that has been developed through the repeated use of that 
term in previous cases.
148
 The statement is at once a description of the 
situation that led to the lawsuit, a judgment about the legal significance 
of that situation, and a statement that in this way the situation, and the 
legal case that arose from it, are connected with thousands of other situa-
tions and cases stretching back hundreds of years. 
Likewise, the doctrinal language judges use to flesh out proximate 
cause analysis incorporates both ordinary meanings and meanings devel-
oped through specialized practice. In ordinary English, to “supersede” 
means to set aside or displace.
149
 The dictionary lists “replace,” “dis-
place,” and “supplant” as synonyms for “supersede.” But one rarely en-
counters a proximate cause analysis that speaks of a displacing, supplant-
ing, or replacing cause. Instead, the word “superseding” is repeated over 
and over. In Derdiarian, for instance, “superseding” appears once in the 
case summary,
150
 twice in the “points of counsel”151 and four times in the 
body of the opinion as part of the terms “superseding act” and “supersed-
ing cause.”152  
In legal practice, “superseding” carries connotations of power from 
another context. A “supersedeas” is a common law writ commanding a 
stay of legal proceedings, preventing the execution of some other writ or 
staying the enforcement of judgment.
153
 In contemporary legal usage, a 
supersedeas
154
 generally issues when a defendant posts a bond that pre-
vents a victorious litigant from executing the judgment pending appeal. 
Judges’ tendency to move back and forth between the Latinate term “su-
persedeas” and the English “supersede” is exemplified in this passage 
from a 1985 Alabama Supreme Court opinion: “The common law rule 
that an appeal automatically superseded the judgment, in and of itself, 
  
 148. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 435. 
 149. WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 2298 (providing the following definitions of “supersede”: 
“1 a: to cause to be set aside b: to force out of use as inferior 2: to take the place, room, or position of 
3: to displace in favor of another”). 
 150. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 666 (N.Y. 1980). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 168–70. 
 153. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1479 (9th ed. 2009). Floyd Abrams tells this story of an 
attempt to obtain a writ of supersedeas to prevent enforcement of an injunction in Pitt v. Playgirl, 
Inc., No. B114591 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997): “Actor Brad Pitt obtained a preliminary injunction 
ordering the recall of an entire monthly issue of Playgirl magazine, which contained nude photo-
graphs of Pitt, and prohibiting further sales, distribution and dissemination of the issue. . . . [T]he 
magazine’s petition for a writ of supersedeas, arguing that the photographs had been previously 
published by others all over the world and that the injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint, 
was summarily rejected.” Floyd Abrams & Gail Johnston, Prior Restraints, in COMMUNICATIONS 
LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2011, at 489 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 2011). 
 154. WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 1161. The term comes from the Latin word for “you shall 
refrain.” Id. 
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has been changed to the extent that an appeal does not ordinarily super-
sede the judgment in the absence of a supersedeas bond.”155 
“Superseding” is thus a word that imports a special kind of legal 
power. Like the Trobriand Islanders for whom the word “flutter” in a 
magic spell evokes the ritual use of pandanus leaves and “magical asso-
ciations between flutter and speed,”156 lawyers and judges familiar with 
the longstanding legal use of supersedeas writs hear in the phrase “super-
seding act” or “superseding cause” not only a description of a causal 
relationship in fact but an invocation of a specific legal technique for 
overcoming liability. Malinowski observes that when a word’s use in a 
magic spell triggers such contextual meanings and associations, “the 
word quivers with magical force.”157 Likewise, for legal practitioners the 
term “superseding cause” calls to mind a supersedeas bond used to stay 
the execution of a legal judgment and so generates a frisson of legal 
power. 
Of course, this sort of conflation of factual description and legal en-
actment in a single stroke is exactly what the realists sought to expose 
about doctrinal analysis. So far, then, my investigation of the similarities 
between judicial proximate cause analysis and magic seems only to re-
confirm the realist critique of proximate cause—and all traditional doc-
trinal analysis—as irrational and false. Certainly it strengthens the cri-
tique that proximate cause analysis employs an argument by association 
that lacks both the definite logical connections claimed for doctrine and 
the straightforward policy judgments that the realists advocated.  
2. Ancestral Bricolage 
Both magic spells and legal opinions claim power from ancestral 
sources. In the Trobriand spell that Malinowski analyzed, the special 
magic terms are followed by a long list of the names of ancestors who 
are said to have lived in “the home of this magic.”158 Anyone familiar 
with Anglo-American case law’s emphasis on precedent will recognize 
this pattern. For instance, in Jackson v. Noel,
159
 another New York case 
citing Derdiarian, the writing judge inserted a list of previous proximate 
cause cases decided by his court after his assertion that a non-party’s 
conduct was a “superseding event” that severed the causal connection 
with the defendant.
160
 As Annette Weiner observed of magic spells, “Not 
  
 155. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Kerlin, 476 So. 2d 64, 66 (Ala. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 156. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 434–35. 
 157. Id. at 435. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 750 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 2002). 
 160. Id. at 107 (“Rather, Peters’ conduct in leaving the roadway and driving his vehicle on to 
the grassy shoulder of the road in an apparent effort to avoid delay, was a superseding event which 
severed whatever causal connection there might have been between the incident between Hoang Le 
and the plaintiff, and Hoang Le’s alleged negligence.” (emphasis added)); see also Dormena v. 
Wallace, 723 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (App. Div. 2001); Brocato v. Grippe, 702 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901 (App. 
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only does the genealogy call on the assistance of the former owners, but 
it gives weight to the spell by demonstrating the successful history that 
the spell has had in effecting persuasion.”161 Sure enough, if one looks up 
the cases in Jackson’s string cite, one finds the exact verbal formula used 
by the Jackson court to establish the lack of proximate cause in that 
case.
162
 
Through the practice of citing precedential sources, the ancestral 
basis for the operative legal language is explicitly called out with each 
new usage. In law, as in magic, that basis is not optional. Without a con-
nection to previous precedential cases, doctrinal words become mere 
expressions of the individual judge’s opinion and lack the authoritative 
legacy that gives those words their distinctive power. This focus on past 
use as opposed to future utility is one of common law adjudication’s 
most magical aspects. Distinguishing magic from modern scientific tech-
niques, the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss pointed out that magi-
cians approach their work retrospectively.
163
 Whereas science looks for-
ward to invent new tools in order to develop new projects, magicians 
must “make do with ‘whatever is at hand.’”164 Lévi-Strauss called this 
retrospective magical technique “bricolage,” after the French “bricoleur,” 
or “do-it-yourself man.”165 Judges’ precedential practice shares this 
property of referring back to previous doctrinal uses and dragging for-
ward into each new usage associations from the past. Thus, doctrinal 
proximate cause analyses are built up out of fragments of previous deci-
sions, which retain some aspects of their previous identity even as they 
are redefined by their new usage. 
The problem for a judge deciding a new case is that existing doc-
trine, as Lévi-Strauss observed of traditional magic, “bears no relation to 
the current project . . . but is the contingent result of all the occasions 
there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the 
remains of previous constructions.”166 The premise of common law adju-
  
Div. 2000); Shatz v. Kutshers Cnty. Club, 668 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (App. Div. 1998); Wright v. N.Y. 
City Transit Auth., 633 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (App. Div. 1995)). Derdiarian also uses this classic 
string-cite technique: “If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseea-
ble in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct, it 
may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus.” Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting 
Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980). 
 161. Annette B. Weiner, From Words to Objects to Magic: ‘Hard Words’ and the Boundaries 
of Social Interaction, in DANGEROUS WORDS: LANGUAGE & POLITICS IN THE PACIFIC 183 (Donald 
Lawrence Brenneis & Fred R. Myers eds., 1984). 
 162. Brocato v. Grippe, 702 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (“[T]he conduct of Grippe, 
who was driving at an excessive rate of speed, was a superseding event which ‘severed whatever 
causal connection there may have been between the occurrence of the accident and the defendant’s 
alleged negligence.’” (quoting Wright v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 633 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (Sup. Ct. 
1995))). 
 163. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 18 (1966).  
 164. Id. at 17. 
 165. Id. at 16–17. 
 166. Id. at 17. 
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dication, however, is that doctrines developed in previous disputes can be 
used to determine the results in a new case. Indeed, as every Anglo-
American law student learns, the doctrinal reasoning skill par excellence 
is the ability to look into factual descriptions from apparently dissimilar 
previous judicial opinions and come up with a way those facts can be 
“synthesized” and recategorized to relate to a new set of facts in the case 
to be decided. Likewise, magicians find ways to relate old spells to new 
situations. For instance, Malinowski described how the Trobrianders 
developed new magic spells for the commercial pearl fishing that arose 
in modern times,
167
 a practice that at first seemed to Malinowski to con-
tradict “the native dogma that magic cannot be invented.”168 The Trobri-
anders explained, however, that pearling spells are “really an old magic 
of shell fishing which refers to all the shells found at the bottom of the 
Lagoon.”169According to the Trobrianders, they had not invented a new 
form of magic, they had simply made use of a latent power in traditional 
shell magic.
170
 
Like magic formulas, to be effective in novel situations, legal doc-
trines must be seen as exploiting a power that was always available or 
made available through previous use, as opposed to being dreamed up by 
the individual magician or judge who employs them. So judges and law-
yers “discover” previously unused powers in old doctrines. The persua-
sive advocate identifies a “fact pattern” that links all the previous cases, 
or parts of them, in a way that allows her to claim that the doctrinal 
phrases used in the previous situations apply to the case at hand and pro-
duce the liability result she wants. Unsurprisingly, proximate cause cases 
often embed their doctrinal language in quotations from previous opin-
ions by the court on which the writing judge sits. So, for instance, the 
swimming pool case Boltax begins with two quotations from Derdiarian 
that knit doctrinal language from that precedent into the new opinion.
171
 
The second quotation appears in a sentence that includes the term “fore-
seeable consequence” and repeats the phrase “intervening act” twice, so 
that it appears first outside and then inside the quote from the preceden-
tial case.
172
 The effect is to link the judges’ use of this term in the new 
case to its use by judicial ancestors in a previous case.
173 
Like the Trobri-
and pearling spells’ use of words previously used in traditional shell 
magic, the judicial practice of embedding doctrinal terms in quotations 
from previously decided cases signals that the power claimed for the 
  
 167. MALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at 402. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 490 N.E.2d 527, 528 (N.Y. 1986). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (“When an intervening act also contributes to plaintiff’s injuries, ‘liability turns upon 
whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the 
defendant’s negligence.’” (quoting Derdiarian, v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315 
(1980))).  
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judicial analysis does not originate with the individual practitioner. In-
stead the words’ effect comes from the practitioner’s ability to access 
words that embody ancestral power and adapt them to address new prob-
lems. 
3. Performative Speech Acts 
Like magic spells, words spoken in legal proceedings not only say 
things, they do things. In the 1950s, J.L. Austin coined the term “per-
formative” to describe utterances that, simply by being spoken in the 
appropriate context, accomplish an action.
174
 Verdicts, blessings, and 
curses are all among the examples Austin gave.
175
 So, for instance, when 
the jury says, “We find the defendant guilty,” or the magician says, “I 
charm thy canoe,” the words perform, rather than describe, the act they 
reference. Such utterances do not inform listeners that juries convict de-
fendants and magicians cast charms; they convict and charm. For Austin, 
legal utterances were paradigms of performative speech acts.
176
 
Austin was the first to systematically explicate the performative as-
pect of language, per se. But the potential for language to perform ac-
tions rather than describe them had long been recognized, notably in both 
anthropological accounts of magic and the legal realists’ critique of legal 
“magic.” Bronislaw Malinowski observed that magic words with the 
syntax of descriptive statements are understood to have “creative power” 
to establish what they describe.
177
 So, when a Trobriand magician says 
“the canoe flies” as part of a magic spell, he is not just describing a fly-
ing or speedy canoe. Nor, for that matter, is he expressing a wish that the 
canoe could fly. The magician’s words are spoken to make the canoe 
speedy. A similar relationship of power exists between judges and doc-
trine. 
The central realist insight about doctrinal analyses, proximate cause 
among them, is that judges’ apparently descriptive statements actually 
construct, rather than simply report, legally significant connections. Ra-
ther than descriptions of factual scenarios, judges’ assertions of a direct 
connection or a superseding cause are spell-like enactments of the legally 
significant connection or separation they articulate. The realist identifica-
tion of legal word magic was primarily an identification of this performa-
tive aspect of judicial language. “A word is used by the savages,” ex-
plained Jerome Frank, “when it can produce an action and not to describe 
  
 174. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–8 (1962). 
 175. Id. at 152, 159. 
 176. Id. at 153. Besides “acquitting” and “convicting,” Austin included in his list of “verdic-
tives” legal speech acts that were not assignments of final liability, for instance “find (as a matter of 
fact)” and “hold, as a matter of law.” Id. at 152–53. Performative speech acts encompass many more 
ordinary contexts as well: for instance, agreeing, promising, or betting. Id. at 156–57. 
 177. STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION AND THE SCOPE OF 
RATIONALITY 73–74, 80 (1990) (discussing BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, THE LANGUAGE OF MAGIC 
AND GARDENING (1965)). 
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one, still less to translate thoughts. The word therefore has a power of its 
own, it is a means of bringing things about . . . .”178 Likewise, Frank ar-
gued, the “solving words” of doctrine “become substitutes for action.”179  
When a judge says that a plaintiff’s reckless dive into what he knew 
was the shallow end of a pool “was an unforeseeable superseding 
event,”180 the doctrinal words appear to be describing the facts of the 
case. But from a realist perspective, what is really going on is the judicial 
construction of a legal status. The judge is not just reporting a factual 
relationship, he is constructing a relationship—in this case a lack of as-
sociation—that has a legal effect. Even more obviously, a judge or jury’s 
conclusion that a defendant’s negligent act is the “proximate cause” of 
the plaintiff’s injuries is not so much a factual proposition about a real-
world relationship as a performative speech act that connects the defend-
ant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury in a way that creates legal liability 
for the defendant like the more overtly performative statement, “We find 
the defendant guilty.” 
4. The Contagious and Imitative Magic of Proximate Cause 
If doctrinal analysis performatively creates connections that facili-
tate legal power, proximate cause doctrines make those connections in a 
particularly magical way. The standard proximate cause tests of foresee-
ability and direct connection mirror the classic pathways of sympathetic 
magic—similarity and contiguity. 
The quintessential magical technique is establishing a relationship 
between otherwise unrelated persons, things, and events, so that acting 
on one can affect the other. Early on, anthropologists of magic observed 
that there were two basic methods of establishing such magical contacts: 
(1) contiguity or contagion, and (2) similarity.
181
 Sir Edward Burnett 
Tylor described such “magical associations.”182 He explained that some 
magic employs “[t]he simple idea of joining two objects with a cord, 
taking for granted that this communication will establish connexion or 
carry influence.”183 So, for instance, a magical healer might fasten “one 
  
 178. FRANK, supra note 11 at 85. This passage from Frank is an almost exact quote from 
Bronislaw Malinowski. See Bronislaw Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Lan-
guages, in C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE 
OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 322 (1923). Around the same time 
the realists noted that legal language was similar to magic in its performative force, Malinowski was 
likening Trobriand magic to law as a way to describe its performative aspect, comparing the power 
of magic words to the “creative power” of contracts and wedding vows. Both the realists and Mali-
nowski made those observations well before Austin identified the common “performative” aspect of 
language. 
 179. Id. at 62. 
 180. Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 490 N.E.2d 527, 528 (N.Y. 1986). 
 181. JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH 12 (abridged ed. 1930); EDWARD 
BURNETT TYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE 115–17 (Harper ed., 1958) (1871). 
 182. TYLOR, supra note 181, at 115–16. 
 183. Id. at 117. 
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end of a string to the ailing part of the patient’s body” and then suck on 
the string for relief.
184
 Another example is the familiar use of personal 
property or hair or nail cuttings to do magical harm to their owners.
185
 In 
other cases, Tylor observed that the magical “connexion is that of mere 
analogy or symbolism,” as when a “Zulu may be seen chewing a bit of 
wood, in order, by this symbolic act, to soften the heart of the man he 
wants to buy oxen from,” or when Germans leave the locks and bolts in a 
dying man’s house open so that his soul may escape and Cornishmen eat 
fish from tail to head to bring the other fishes’ heads toward shore.186 
Another early anthropologist of magic, Sir James Frazer, identified 
two organizing principles in Tylor’s examples: the “law of contact,” 
which produced contagious magic, and the “law of similarity,” which 
produced magical connections based on resemblance.
187
 So, for instance, 
in Tylor’s examples above, the nail cuttings, hair, and string work 
through the magic of contiguity or contagion, and the wood chewing, 
locks and bolts, and headfirst fish work through the magic of similarity 
or imitation. Though much of Frazer’s theory of magic has fallen into 
disfavor, the associational principles of contiguity and similarity have 
been further developed by numerous subsequent studies of magic, ritual, 
and language.
188
 
The two doctrinal tests of proximate cause can be sorted into Fra-
zer’s categories.189 The test of direct connection, in which the question is 
whether the “chain of causation” has been “severed” or remains unbro-
ken, is a connection through contiguity. Foreseeability establishes a con-
nection based on similarity. It is a test of the resemblance between the 
injury that materialized and the injury that the defendant should have 
seen coming as a result of her negligence. In magic, contiguity and simi-
larity are like two pathways along which magical force can travel.
190
 
Likewise, in proximate cause analysis, legal power exercised by the court 
can only reach the defendant if one of these forms of association is estab-
lished. In order to get legal power to flow from the court to the defend-
ant, the plaintiff must establish that her injury was linked to the defend-
ant’s actions by contact (direct connection through a causal chain) or 
similarity (foreseeability).  
  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 118–19. 
 187. FRAZER, supra note 181. 
 188. TAMBIAH, supra note 177, at 52–53 (calling the principles the “molten gold in Frazer’s 
volcanic overflow”); Michelle Z. Rosaldo, It’s All Uphill: The Creative Metaphors of Ilongot Magi-
cal Spells, in SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE USE 177, 177–78 (Mary Sanches & Ben 
G. Blount eds., 1975). 
 189. See generally FRAZER, supra note 181, at 11–36. 
 190. Id. at 12. 
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III. THE SKILLED REVELATION OF SKILLED CONCEALMENT 
Faith and skepticism are alike traditional. 
—E.E. Evans-Pritchard
191
 
The similarities between proximate cause analysis and the tech-
niques of ritual magic were foreshadowed by the realist critique of doc-
trinal “magic words.” This takes us back to the original puzzle—Why 
have doctrines survived that critique? Why do judges continue to prac-
tice, and citizens continue to accept, doctrinal legal magic in the face of 
widespread recognition that, as the courts in Milwaukee and Derdiarian 
acknowledged, proximate cause “is not a question of science or legal 
knowledge,”192 but a matter of “policy considerations”?193 If we know 
that doctrines do not determine the results in lawsuits, why do we con-
tinue to practice doctrinal analysis as if it were capable of independently 
producing results? Why doesn’t skepticism about doctrine do away with 
doctrinal practice? 
Again expanding on anthropological studies, I want to suggest a 
strange possibility: Rather than discrediting doctrinal analyses, courts’ 
explicit recognition of doctrinal indeterminacy is keeping doctrine alive. 
In cultures where ritual magic is a common practice, skepticism about 
magical efficacy is not fatal to that practice. Indeed, at least one anthro-
pological observer has concluded that not only does magic survive the 
exposure of illusion, it feeds on it.
194
 I will argue that the exposure of 
doctrinal indeterminacy has been incorporated into judicial proximate 
cause analysis as a sort of ritual of unmasking, comparable to the role of 
skeptical revelations by practitioners of magic. That comparison suggests 
a partial explanation for the persistence of proximate cause. Like ritual 
magic in other cultures, rather than resisting skepticism, doctrinal prac-
tice finds a way to incorporate—and even to thrive on—skeptical attacks. 
But the anthropology of magic only takes us so far. We are left with two 
important questions—How does skeptical critique become incorporated 
  
 191. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 107. 
 192. Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876). 
 193. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314 (1980); see also CSX Transp., 
Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2642 (2011) (plurality opinion) (“As we have noted, . . . the phrase 
‘proximate cause’ is shorthand for the policy-based judgment that not all factual causes contributing 
to an injury should be legally cognizable causes.”); Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1090–
91 (Ill. 2004) (finding that the doctrine of public nuisance does not encompass the novel claim of the 
plaintiffs owing to a public-policy determination because proximate cause is only a boundary used to 
set liability based upon notions of justice and policy); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 20 
(N.J. 1997) (“Moreover, the limit of proximate cause is ultimately, an issue of law and similarly 
entails a consideration of public policy and fairness.”); Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104 
(N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is, that because 
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a 
series of events beyond a certain point.”). 
 194. Taussig, supra note 1, at 221–22. 
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in a way that ends up sustaining the practice it attacks, and how does the 
incorporation of skepticism affect the legitimacy of doctrinal practice?  
A. Magic Coexists with Skepticism 
It may seem strange to say that magic incorporates, let alone thrives 
on, skepticism. We tend to define cultures that practice magic as uncriti-
cal of those practices. Like the realists, we assume that practitioners of 
magic are either blindly gullible or deliberate fakers. But anthropological 
accounts of magic belie those stereotypes. Even Victorian anthropolo-
gists, who saw magic as the opposite of scientific truth (a kind of fraud 
or delusion), described a puzzling combination of faith and fabrication 
among magic’s practitioners. Writing in 1889, E.B. Tylor mused:  
Magic has not its origin in fraud, and seems seldom practised as an 
utter imposture. The sorcerer generally learns his time-honoured pro-
fession in good faith, and retains his belief in it more or less from 
first to last; at once dupe and cheat, he combines the energy of a be-
liever with the cunning of a hypocrite.
195
 
Modern field anthropologists confirm the complex attitudes of practi-
tioners but cast those attitudes as both less naïve and less dishonest. 
Mary Douglas, for instance, compared magic rituals with money.
196
 She 
pointed out that like currency, magic performs its social role so long as 
the public has faith in it.
197
 If I inform you that money is only paper, and 
thus worthless, that will not shake your belief in money’s value or pre-
vent you from using cash for purchases. Why not? Because you already 
know that money is “worthless” in this sense. But that does not mean that 
every time you use money to buy something you are engaging in a fraud 
or laboring under a delusion. You, and everyone with whom you conduct 
those transactions, understand that money has no “real” value but that it 
is nevertheless powerful. Likewise, magic’s effectiveness as a social 
institution does not depend on a belief that false techniques are real. 
The analogy to money is useful for pointing out that ritual can par-
take of a pretend or symbolic power without triggering accusations of 
hypocrisy or self-delusion. But it does not fully capture the tension be-
tween continued doctrinal practice and skepticism about doctrinal effica-
cy. At least since the nineteenth century, courts’ practice of formal doc-
trinal adjudication and pronouncements about doctrinal objectivity have 
apparently conflicted with judicial acknowledgements of doctrine’s fail-
ure to produce independent outcomes. Unlike our monetary system, legal 
practice is apparently fraught with overtly contradictory actions and 
  
 195. TYLOR, supra note 181, at 134. 
 196. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND 
TABOO 86 (Routledge Classics ed. 2002). 
 197. Id. 
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statements. Indeed, these contradictions about the role doctrine plays in 
determining legal outcomes are basic and longstanding.
198
  
Something much closer to the contradictions in our views of legal 
decision making appears in observations of magical rituals. In the early 
twentieth century, E.E. Evans-Pritchard spent years living with and stud-
ying the Azande in Sudan, producing one of the most highly regarded 
studies of ritual magic.
199
 The Azande employ witch doctors to identify 
witches and heal the sick.
200
 Evans-Pritchard found that Azande do not 
necessarily believe that a witch doctor’s medicine-induced trance and 
ritual dance determine his selection of the witches identified during the 
ritual. It was “not difficult to see that a witch-doctor’s revelations are 
largely based on local scandal, and that to some extent he thinks out his 
answers to questions while dancing and strutting about.”201 And it was 
not only a visiting anthropologist who could see the non-ritual basis of 
the witch doctor’s choices. Evans-Pritchard was quite clear that “Azande 
are aware of this fact.”202 Moreover, Azande “not only know that witch-
doctors can produce objects from the bodies of their patients by fraud, 
but also . . . are aware of the kind of fraud they employ.”203 As Evans-
Pritchard described it then, doubts about witch doctors’ magical tech-
niques are not marginal.
204
 Nevertheless, “this knowledge does not con-
flict with great faith in witch-doctors.”205 He therefore concluded that 
“skepticism is included in the pattern of belief in witch-doctors.” 206  
Evans-Pritchard hypothesized that the reason for this coexistence of 
doubt and faith is that though “Azande . . . state that many, even most 
witch-doctors are frauds,” they believe that some “do actually produce 
remarkable cures.”207 That explanation is extremely unsatisfying. After 
so much time spent detailing the pervasive recognition of the witch doc-
tors’ tricks, it is hard to see why Azande should nevertheless keep ex-
pecting that there are some real witch doctors, or for that matter, why 
they should continue to put up with the ones they know are “frauds.” 
Likewise, Franz Boas, in his classic study of Kwakiutl shamans in 
the Pacific Northwest, found widespread skepticism about magic power 
and never really explained the continued practice of magic despite that 
skepticism.
208
 Again, the tension between belief and skepticism is close 
  
 198. TAMANAHA, supra note 7, at 228; Solum, supra note 5. 
 199. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at vii. 
 200. Id. at 65–66. 
 201. Id. at 87. 
 202. Id. (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 107. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. FRANZ BOAS, THE RELIGION OF THE KWAKUTL INDIANS PART II, at 1 (Helen Codere ed., 
1966) (1930). 
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to the surface and pervasive. Boas’s Kwakiutl informant, George Hunt, 
himself a shaman, described how he was originally moved to study mag-
ic in an effort to test its authenticity: “I desired to learn about the sham-
an, whether it is true or whether it is made up and whether they pretend 
to be shamans.”209 Not only was Hunt himself skeptical, he found plenty 
of others who shared his view that the shamans were faking it. “Have 
you not felt the quartz crystal of the liars, the shamans, the one that they 
referred to that was thrown into your stomach?” asks one man Hunt met 
on his quest.
210
 When Hunt replies that he did not feel the magic, the man 
responds, “You will never feel it, for these are just great lies what the 
shamans say.”211  
Indeed, the Kwakiutl shamans themselves reveal their artifice, at 
least to one another.
212
 After Hunt “cures” a patient by pretending to suck 
the sickness out of the patient’s body, another shaman begs him to reveal 
whether the “sickness” that stuck on his palm was real or “was it only 
made up,” and shows Hunt the nail in the head ring that he uses to 
scratch his palm and produce blood when he pretends to suck out sick-
ness so that “[a]ll these fools believe that it is truly biting the palm of my 
hand.”213 Boas concluded that the Kwakiutl are in no way innocent about 
the tricks entailed in their shamans’ traditional magic, but they neverthe-
less retain a belief in “the ‘true’ power of shamanism.”214 For some rea-
son, “[e]xposures do not weaken” that belief.215 
B. Rituals of Unmasking 
Discussing Boas and Evans-Pritchard’s findings, Michael Taussig 
argues that not only does magic survive skepticism, magic needs skepti-
cism in order to thrive.
216
 Taussig contends that the coexistence of faith 
and skepticism in cultures where magic is central is founded on “a deep-
seated” but generally unarticulated “public secret as to the existence of a 
trick.”217 In the repeated skeptical exposures described by Evans-
Pritchard, Boas, and others, Taussig finds a “meta-rite” in which magic is 
exposed as a trick and yet somehow not discredited.
218
 He suggests that 
when skeptical observers call the authenticity of magic into question, 
magicians feed on that exposure: “[S]kepticism and belief actively can-
nibalize one another,” he says, “so that continuous injections of recruits 
  
 209. Id. In an iconic text of early twentieth-century anthropology, Hunt, also known as 
Quesalid, describes his skeptical shamanism. Id. 
 210. Id. at 5. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 32–33. 
 213. Id. at 31–32. 
 214. FRANZ BOAS, KWAKIUTL ETHNOGRAPHY 121 (Helen Codere ed., 1966); Taussig, supra 
note 1, at 228. 
 215. Taussig, supra note 1, at 228. 
 216. Id. at 221. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 243. 
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like [Hunt], who are full of questioning, are required.”219 But he never 
explains how the injection of skepticism feeds rather than disables mag-
ic, or for that matter why magic’s persistence does not eventually stifle 
doubt. 
Nevertheless, Taussig contributes a crucial insight by emphasizing 
the extent of skeptical interactions in magic-laden cultures.
220
 In this 
way, he turns an aspect of magical practice that has generally been pre-
sented as a marginal exception into a central attribute. So, for instance, 
describing Evans-Pritchard’s project to learn the secrets of the witch doc-
tors, Taussig remarks that the problem really is that there are no se-
crets.
221
 According to Evans-Pritchard’s own descriptions, everybody 
knows the witch doctors are planting the bits of charcoal, splinters, black 
beetles, or worms that they then pretend to extract from their patients.
222
 
Despite this knowledge, however, direct revelations of the witch doctors’ 
trickery are at least sometimes regarded as shocking. 
The complex effect of revealing magic trickery comes through in 
Evans-Pritchard’s description of a time when he exposed a witch doc-
tor’s sleight of hand. During a healing ritual, Evans-Pritchard confronted 
the magician with the piece of charcoal the magician had planted so that 
he might later “extract” it from a sick man’s body.223 An apprentice was 
present, and Evans-Pritchard describes him as initially devastated by the 
trick’s revelation.224 “When he had recovered from his astonishment he 
was in serious doubt whether he ought to continue his initiation.”225 But 
then a very curious thing happened. A day or two later, the initiate “had 
completely recovered his poise and developed a marked degree of self-
assurance” in his healing techniques, a level of confidence that he “had 
not shown before this incident.”226 
Without being able to explain why the Zande initiate wound up 
more committed to his craft, law teachers may find his experience famil-
iar. It seems to resemble the journey of law students, as it dawns on them 
that the doctrinal reasoning they are struggling to rationalize in the cases 
they read cannot be made to produce determinate results. An initial atti-
tude of trusting belief in law’s reason is replaced by cynicism or aliena-
tion, which in turn gives way—in some students right away, in others 
gradually over time, in still others not at all—to mastery. Through law 
professors’ and the students’ own repeated skilled revelation of the 
skilled concealment of judicial sleight of hand, law students acquire that 
  
 219. Id. at 235. 
 220. See id. at 222. 
 221. Id. at 246. 
 222. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 107. 
 223. Id. at 102–04; Taussig, supra note 1, at 243–46. 
 224. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 104. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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“mix of faith and skepticism” that Taussig argues is necessary to the 
practice of magic.
227
  
Returning to the puzzle of proximate cause’s survival, judges’ re-
peated revelation of doctrinal indeterminacy looks a good deal like the 
ritual unmasking Taussig identifies in magic. Courts have for decades 
continued to practice doctrinal analysis in the face of revelations of doc-
trinal indeterminacy. The judges who combine the application and cri-
tique of proximate cause doctrines share with the Zande witch doctors 
and Kwakiutl shamans a tendency to reveal the tricks on which their 
practice is based. Moreover, in both magic and law, rather than being 
destabilized, the traditional practice survives and even thrives after its 
exposure as a trick. 
It might at first appear that there is a crucial difference between the 
exposure of magical and doctrinal tricks. After all, in a sense, the trick of 
magic and the trick of doctrine have opposite results. Whereas magicians 
use tricks to appear more personally powerful, judges use doctrine to 
obscure their personal power. Magicians use tricks to make it look like 
they are causing effects that are not really their doing. In contrast, judges 
use doctrine to make it look like their liability determinations are not 
really their own doing, that the determinations are dictated by impersonal 
legal rules beyond their control. Magicians use tricks to boast of powers 
they do not have, while judges use tricks to hide power they really exer-
cise. 
With these differences in mind, it might seem that skepticism plays 
a different role in magic and in law. In one sense, this is true. The skepti-
cal observer of magic says that the sorcerer who claims to be magically 
uniting or severing objects with his words is just talking. The realist ob-
server of judicial decision making says that the judge who claims to be 
merely describing legally significant connections is actually doing some-
thing, namely making those connections, and thus setting in motion the 
coercive government force that backs those decisions. From a skeptic’s 
perspective, then, a magician is doing less than he claims; a judge is do-
ing more. 
Nevertheless, upon consideration, there is a crucial similarity. In 
both law and magic, classical practices obscure the fact that the practi-
tioners are making choices. Both magicians and judges are manipulating 
practical techniques—whether spells or precedents, palmed bits of char-
coal or analogies of direct connection—to produce effects. In both magic 
and doctrinal analysis, the techniques make it appear that something oth-
er than the practitioner’s individually motivated choices is producing the 
outcome. Because a judge has the power to bring about a decision that 
triggers state-sponsored violence, attributing that decision to external, 
  
 227. Taussig, supra note 1, at 245. 
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impersonal forces in one sense diminishes her personal power. But, of 
course, the realists’ point was that the aura of legitimacy gained by 
masking personal choices ultimately leads to much greater political and 
institutional power for judges. Though judicial decisions are backed by 
government force, much of society’s compliance with those decisions is 
achieved not by force or the threat of force but by voluntary adherence 
based on the notion that these decisions are the product of recognizably 
legal methods, not simply the unconstrained personal preferences of in-
dividual judges. The illusion that judges’ decisions come about through 
impersonal legal formulas rather than personal choice increases the per-
ceived legitimacy and legality of judicial decisions and thus, presumably, 
the likelihood that individuals and the public at large will abide by those 
decisions. 
The idea that legal compliance is based on illusion raises serious is-
sues of legitimacy. Later in this Article, I will sketch some preliminary 
thoughts about how we might consider those issues. For now, however, I 
want to set aside normative questions and continue to pursue the compar-
ison of doctrine and ritual performance to see if it can help us to under-
stand more about how doctrinal analysis continues to generate legal 
compliance even when practitioners and the public at large recognize that 
doctrinal determinacy is illusory.  
It seems that the tension between practice and skepticism is aligned 
in magic healing and doctrinal legal analysis. The shaman sucks a bloody 
tuft of down from the patient’s body and removes it to effect a cure, and 
the skeptic says the shaman had it in his mouth the whole time. The 
judge uncovers a direct connection between the defendant’s negligence 
and the plaintiff’s injury, and skeptics say she picked and chose among 
many available precedents to create that connection. In both cases, prac-
titioners behave as if the decisive moves are brought about through a 
technique that accesses impersonal power that they engage and channel, 
while critical observation and practitioners’ own declarations reveal that 
the practitioners are dictating the moves themselves. The question, then, 
is how, in both magic and law, those skeptical revelations amplify rather 
than destroy the practices they expose. 
C. How Does Unmasking Work to Sustain Power? 
[E]veryone knew that real dancers animated the unicorn costume. 
That was part of the enchantment. 
—Laurel Kendall
228
 
Michael Taussig interpreted the revelation of the witch doctor’s 
trick as emblematic of the role skepticism plays in keeping alive tradi-
  
 228. Laurel Kendall, Eye of the Dragon, NAT. HIST., June 2007, at 48, 48. 
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tional practices of magical healing. He proposed that, before the revela-
tion, knowledge of the trick was a “public secret,” something that “is 
known not to know.”229 Exposing the trick was then an “oblique ritual of 
exposure of the secret within the ritual of the witch-doctors.”230 Taussig 
concluded that there is a “need for rites of exposure built into rites of 
magic so as to strengthen magic itself”231 and ultimately that “[m]agic is 
efficacious not despite the trick but on account of its exposure.”232 But he 
never really explained why this should be so. How does magic, including 
doctrinal magic, not only survive skepticism but feed on it? Why should 
exposing an image of power as only an image make that image still more 
powerful? Why does unmasking the inability of shamans’ rituals to real-
ly pull objects from the bodies of the afflicted and the inability of judges’ 
doctrinal analysis to really determine who should pay for an afflicted 
person’s injury sustain, or perhaps even increase, confidence in the insti-
tutions and individuals that employ those techniques? 
One possibility is that revelations of sleight of hand and acknowl-
edgment of doctrinal indeterminacy amount to what social scientists call 
“inoculation” against criticism.233 Inoculation theory posits that it is pos-
sible to protect beliefs against outside criticism by confronting believers 
with a relatively weak challenge in advance of a serious critique.
234
 The 
idea, captured by the medical metaphor, is that a calculatedly weak initial 
challenge—the “inoculation”—stimulates the believer to mount a de-
fense, a kind of ideological immunity, that she can later use to fend off 
actual attacks on her views.
235
 So, for instance, a salesman who has con-
vinced a customer to order a relatively expensive product might end his 
pitch by pointing out that the customer’s friends and neighbors may say 
he has overpaid and by asking the customer how he will respond if that 
happens. The idea is that when the customer later encounters skepticism, 
  
 229. Taussig, supra note 1, at 242. 
 230. Id. at 243. 
 231. Id. at 244. 
 232. Id. at 222. 
 233. William J. McGuire, The Effectiveness of Supportive and Refutational Defenses in Im-
munizing and Restoring Beliefs Against Persuasion, 24 SOCIOMETRY 184, 184 (1961); William J. 
McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some Contemporary Approaches, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY VOL. I, at 192 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1964) [hereinafter 
McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion]; William J. McGuire, Persistence of the Resistance to 
Persuasion Induced by Various Types of Prior Belief Defenses, 64 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
241, 241 (1962); William J. McGuire & Demetrios Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy of Various 
Types of Prior Belief-Defense in Producing Immunity Against Persuasion, 62 J. ABNORM. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 327, 327 (1961) [hereinafter McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy]; William J. 
McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion Conferred by Active and Passive Prior Refutation of the Same 
and Alternative Arguments, 63 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 326, 326 (1961) [hereinafter McGuire, 
Resistance to Persuasion]; Demetrios Papageorgis & William J. McGuire, The Generality of Immun-
ity to Persuasion Produced by Pre-exposure to Weakened Counterarguments, 62 J. ABNORM. & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 475 (1961) [hereinafter Papageorgis & McGuire, The Generality of Immunity to 
Persuasion]. 
 234. McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233. 
 235. McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy, supra note 233. 
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he will be prepared to defend his purchase rather than cancel his order.
236
 
Inoculation theory, originally proposed by William J. McGuire in the 
1950s, has been tested and used in a variety of clinical and practical set-
tings.
237
 The inoculation effect does not appear to depend on generating 
specific counterarguments. Challenges to one aspect of an idea seem to 
increase believers’ ability to fend off later challenges, even when they 
are substantively unrelated to the initial challenge.
238
 However it 
works,
239
 inoculation seems to strengthen existing attitudes about every-
thing from the dangers of smoking to the value of democratic govern-
ment.
240
 Mounting a mild challenge apparently stimulates a defense of 
the criticized beliefs.  
Could the persistence of magical and doctrinal practices despite 
skeptical attacks be explained by inoculation theory? In the inoculation 
scheme, isolated revelations of practitioners’ illusory techniques build 
defenses against more sustained challenges to those practices.
241
 For in-
  
 236. See McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233 (presenting this theory in the 
abstract); Preston Campbell, Inoculation, the Secret Persuasion Strategy to Lock Down Your Sales 
and Reinforce Decisions, SALES MARKETING SECRETS (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:22 PM), 
http://sales.artcony.com/2012/12/inoculation-the-secret-persuasion-strategy-to-lock-down-your-
sales-and-reinforce-decisions/. 
 237. McGuire utilized health truisms in his research that were generally held to be true by the 
vast majority of persons studied (e.g., that everyone should brush their teeth after a meal). Id. at 328. 
Other studies have greatly expanded the reach. See e.g., Mark M. Bernard, Gregory R. Maio, & 
James M. Olson, The Vulnerability of Values to Attack: Inoculation of Values and Value-Relevant 
Attitudes, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63, 67 (2003) (testing the widely held value of 
equality, rather than a truism, and finding essentially the same results as in McGuire’s studies); Bobi 
Ivanov, Michael Pfau & Kimberly A. Parker, Can Inoculation Withstand Multiple Attacks? An 
Examination of the Effectiveness of the Inoculation Strategy Compared to the Supportive and Resto-
ration Strategies, 36 COMMC’N RESEARCH 655, 671 (2009) (finding that inoculation was superior to 
supportive and restoration strategies in an advertising context); Michael Pfau et al., Efficacy of 
Inoculation Strategies in Promoting Resistance to Political Attack Messages: Application to Direct 
Mail, 57 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 25 (1990); Michael Pfau & Steve Van Bockern, The Persistence 
of Inoculation in Conferring Resistance to Smoking Initiation Among Adolescents: The Second Year, 
20 HUMAN COMMC’N RESEARCH 413, 413 (1994); Michael J. Ross & R. Scott Berger, Effects of 
Stress Inoculation Training on Athletes’ Postsurgical Pain and Rehabilitation After Orthopedic 
Injury, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 406, 408 (1996). 
 238. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 245; McGuire, Re-
sistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 330; see also John A. Banas & Stephen A. Rains, A Meta-
analysis of Research on Inoculation Theory, 77 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 281, 281 (2010) (a meta-
analysis of fifty-four cases testing the effectiveness of inoculation theory found no statistically 
significant difference in relative effectiveness of refutational same and refutational different inocula-
tion messages).  
 239. McGuire, Resistance to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 326. McGuire postulates two 
potential ways it works, (1) that pre-exposure to the possibility of the belief being attacked leads the 
person to begin to develop defenses and reasons to hold the belief valid; and (2) pre-exposure to 
attack, along with the refutations of that initial small attack, lead the person to hold all subsequent 
attacks less impressive and less valid. In subsequent research, McGuire focused on and considered 
paramount the first reasoning. See generally McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, supra 
note 233. But see Ronald W. Rogers & Donald L. Thistlethwaite, An Analysis of Active and Passive 
Defenses in Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, 11 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302, 307 (1969) 
(suggesting that it is the second possibility, that of making subsequent attacks less impressive, which 
is the stronger motivation in denying subsequent attacks). 
 240. See generally Pfau et. al, supra note 237 passim; Pfau & Bockern, supra note 237. 
 241. Papageorgis & McGuire, The Generality of Immunity to Persuasion, supra note 233, at 
478. 
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stance, confronting the witch doctor with the palmed charcoal would 
stimulate believers in his power to mount defenses of that power’s au-
thenticity. Likewise, asserting that proximate cause is really about policy 
limits on liability (and thus implicitly that doctrines do not really deter-
mine proximate cause outcomes) would stimulate doctrinal practitioners 
to defend doctrinal determinacy. In this view, New York judges adjudi-
cating negligence cases look to Derdiarian as a precedent and find there 
both an extended doctrinal analysis and a mild skeptical attack on doctri-
nal determinacy. According to inoculation theory, Derdiarian’s gentle 
critique would stimulate those judges’ defenses of their own doctrinal 
practice. Perhaps, then, Derdiarian’s reference to the policy basis for 
proximate cause awakens defenses of doctrinal reasoning and so actually 
strengthens faith in proximate cause doctrines.
242
 In this way, inoculation 
theory might explain both the puzzling persistence of proximate cause 
and how Taussig’s “skilled revelation of skilled concealment” works to 
strengthen rather than diminish faith in magic.
243
 
It has to be said, however, that the inoculation account does not 
neatly fit either magical or legal confrontations with skepticism. In par-
ticular, in both contexts overt defenses against skeptical attacks are strik-
ingly absent. The Azande do not defend magic as real, and explicit ar-
guments that proximate cause doctrines are really determinate are rare. 
Indeed, direct defenses of doctrinal determinacy in general are rare out-
side of certain institutional settings, for example, Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings. Magicians who practice sleight of hand and judges who 
use doctrinal techniques apparently feel no need to defend their practices; 
they simply maintain them. It is, of course, possible that believers in 
magic and doctrine are mounting unspoken defensive arguments in their 
heads, but there is no evidence that is the case.  
Furthermore, the magical and legal examples differ from the inocu-
lation paradigm in a way that inoculation theorists call crucial.
244
 Ac-
cording to inoculation theory, it is important that the believer confront 
the weak, “inoculating” argument before responding to sustained at-
tacks.
245
 Otherwise, criticism will likely overwhelm belief before the 
believer has a chance to build defenses.
246
 But the revelation of the char-
coal trick or the reference to the policy in Derdiarian came in the midst 
of sustained cultural recognition of the tricks they exposed. Indeed, the 
striking feature of both post-realist legal practice and the magical healing 
practices anthropologists describe is the longstanding and pervasive in-
  
 242. Id. at 475 (discussing the social science underpinnings of immunity to persuasion theo-
ries). 
 243. Taussig, supra note 1, at 222. 
 244. McGuire & Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy, supra note 233, at 333 (noting that pre-
exposure to counterarguments must be monitored carefully so as not to overwhelm, rather than 
stimulate, the subject’s defenses).  
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 333–34. 
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tensity of skepticism about the authenticity of those practices. Rather 
than believers facing a discrete, early challenge, practices and critiques 
of those practices seem to coexist side by side and even intertwine for 
generations. That structure does not fit the inoculation profile.  
I want to suggest an alternative explanation for the persistence of 
magic and doctrine in the face of equally persistent skepticism. Unmask-
ing the indeterminacy of magic and doctrine strengthens those practices 
because it brings into view the real wonder of practitioners’ work with 
their techniques. Ritual practitioners sustain a contradiction, acting “as 
if” the ritual were real while constantly aware of the gap between ritual 
and reality.
247
 Being reminded that ritual order is make-believe may ex-
pose the gap and be momentarily shocking. But ultimately revealing ritu-
al illusions is not destructive to ritual practice because the artificiality 
that is revealed was always understood to be present, even if that artifice 
was not fully articulated or openly acknowledged. Moreover, unmasking 
reorients our attention away from any lingering doubts or ambivalence 
about the techniques’ authenticity and toward the way those techniques 
are being deployed in the particular case at hand.  
By temporarily relieving any effort to act as if doctrinal analysis 
“really” works, unmasking allows participants to focus completely on the 
unfolding performance. Like other complex ritual performances, doctri-
nal analysis “requires coordination, circumspection, precision in practice, 
and a well-tempered attention to what one is about.”248 The revelation 
that the practitioner’s techniques are flawed and artificial does away with 
any need to circumvent our knowledge that a technique is not inde-
pendently productive. It frees participants instead to identify with, appre-
ciate, and criticize the genuine struggle of the practitioner who attempts 
to produce acceptably legal results with real effects by mastering an arti-
ficial technique.  
In this view, the confrontation with artifice does two (related) 
things. First, it relieves any need for participants to pretend they believe 
that the symbolic techniques are real. Second, after confronting the “pub-
lic secret” of the trick, participants can engage in or witness the genuine 
struggle to use the mastery of those artificial tricks to produce acceptable 
results. By calling attention to the trick, the practitioner effectively as-
serts that her performance of that trick will nevertheless be able to pro-
duce a result that we will recognize as authentically magical or legal. 
Indeed, the implicit claim is that the results of doctrinal or magical tech-
niques will be superior to what could be achieved without the practition-
er’s craft, even if those techniques rely on illusion. The unmasking thus 
demands faith that the practitioner’s performance of the practical tech-
  
 247. As Seligman et al. put it, ritual exists in the subjunctive mode. ADAM B. SELIGMAN ET 
AL., RITUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: AN ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF SINCERITY 7–8 (2008). 
 248. Id. at xi. 
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niques, however artificial, is itself somehow valuable and can produce 
results superior to what the practitioner could create by eschewing the 
formal, artificial practices and approaching the problem directly and in-
strumentally. 
The idea that an admittedly false technique could be superior to no 
technique at all may seem strange. In the legal context, it violates the 
value of transparency that is a core norm of both democracy and the rule 
of law.
249
 But consider a problem that realist critics of doctrinal obfusca-
tion rarely acknowledge. Definitionally, in order to be a “legal” result as 
we understand that term, a decision must reflect something other than the 
decision maker’s point of view. As Keith Bybee puts it, the sine qua non 
of a legal decision is that the decision maker “look outside his own will” 
for the result.
250
 Indeed, the same need for an outside source of some 
kind is definitively part of the idea of “magic.” Given that requirement, it 
may be more “legal” to continue to practice an artificial, communally 
sanctioned technique even if that technique is understood to be incapable 
of producing the result without the conscious intervention of the practi-
tioner’s own will. That is, given the choice between a process that openly 
and only relies on the practitioner’s own will and one in which the practi-
tioner engages in a formal artificial technique on the way, as it were, to 
producing results through her own individual choices, it may be more 
“legal” to go through the artificial practice. I do not mean to endorse or 
condemn the legitimacy of such a process. I mean to use the term “legal” 
in a positive, descriptive sense. That is, I mean that a decision-making 
process that includes a technique that looks as if it produces externally 
dictated results may conform to our cultural definition of legality more 
closely than a process that straightforwardly eschews formal techniques 
in favor of transparent individual choice making.  
In any case, as a descriptive matter, it seems a mistake to insist that 
because doctrine does not determine results, doctrinal analysis is not 
really part of legal decision making. E.E. Evans-Pritchard points out that 
a Zande witch doctor’s ritual dance is likely not the cause of his witch-
craft determinations.
251
 Yet the dance is still a significant part of the pro-
  
 249. Regarding the centrality of transparency as a democratic value in multiple contexts, see 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3118 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s historical analysis as capable of “smuggl[ing]” or “bur[ying]” subjective judgments, thus 
defeating the importance of transparency in adjudication); Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 62 
(2005) (holding that the tax court could not exclude special trial judge reports from the record on 
appeal, the Court noted, “In comparison to the nearly universal practice of transparency in forums in 
which one official conducts the trial . . . and another official subsequently renders the final decision, 
the Tax Court’s practice is anomalous”); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) (noting that 
“[t]ransparency is essential to maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system, ensuring its 
integrity, and protecting the rights of the accused”). See generally THE RIGHT TO KNOW: 
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD passim (Ann Florini ed., 2007); EDWARD A. SHILS, THE 
TORMENT OF SECRECY: THE BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN SECURITY POLICIES 
passim (1956). 
 250. Bybee, supra note 13, at 306–07; see also CARTER & BURKE, supra note 18.  
 251. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 87. 
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cess through which the Azande address injury and misfortune. The witch 
doctor probably relies on village gossip and personal observation to think 
out the answers to his questions “while dancing and strutting about.”252 
Likewise, judges’ decisions are determined by nondoctrinal factors, in-
cluding their individual views of justice and the right policy choices, 
influenced by the surrounding culture. To some extent, then, their per-
formance of adjudicating these questions through the application of doc-
trines is just so much legal “dancing and strutting about.”253 But as Ev-
ans-Pritchard insisted, on another level such rites are the method through 
which results are achieved.
254
 We might call that level enactment, to bor-
row a term from both law and ritual performance, expressing the idea 
that the formal public process itself, however artificial, affects the mean-
ing of the results, even if it does not cause those results.
255
  
As Catherine Bell has observed, a fundamental aspect of ritual is 
“the simple imperative to do something in such a way that the doing it-
self gives the acts a special or privileged status.”256 We can understand 
doctrinal analysis, like magical healing, as a shared, conventional crea-
tion, not as a reflection of individual practitioners’ internal state of mind 
or beliefs. “A witch ‘doctor dances the questions.’”257 On the level of 
ritual enactment, the dance remains important even if it does not causally 
determine the results. “An observer who recorded only questions put to 
the witch-doctors and the replies which they gave would leave out the 
whole mechanism by which the answers are obtained . . . .”258 Likewise, 
a judge doctrinally analyzes the question. Even if that doctrinal analysis 
is not the cause of the judge’s liability decision, it remains in this sense 
the mechanism by which the case is decided.  
From this perspective, setting aside the language of doctrinal prox-
imate cause would remove a large part of the process that makes the 
judge’s liability decisions recognizably legal answers. This is so even if 
those answers are substantively determined by other factors—like the 
judge’s political views and the relatively sympathetic nature of the par-
ties to the case. A witch doctor dances his questions and a judge goes 
through the motions of doctrinal analysis. As Evans-Pritchard saw, “[t]he 
  
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 175 (“[T]he view that judicial opinions are largely 
about making a decision that was the product of choice and discretion appear as if it had been com-
pelled by earlier cases and other legal materials is far more than just a widely held opinion—it is 
almost certainly the conventional wisdom.”). 
 254. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 89. 
 255. As Frederick Schauer points out, in the legal context, doctrinal analyses that do not cause 
legal results may nevertheless be used to explain and give reasons for those results in doctrinal 
terms. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 174–75. 
 256. CATHERINE BELL, RITUAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS 166 (1997); see also 
SELIGMAN ET. AL., supra note 247, at 4 (quoting Catherine Bell for same proposition). 
 257. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 89. 
 258. Id. (emphasis added). 
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full meaning” of a social practice in which such rituals take place “can 
only be grasped when this dancing is understood.”259 
That observation brings us back to the question of how skepticism 
works with doctrine or dancing to strengthen rather than disable ritual 
practice. I want to suggest that it has something to do with a suspension 
of conflict. Ritual performance proceeds on two levels. We act as if it 
were real at the same time that we know ritual exists as a counterpart, or 
even opposite, of real life. In the moment of skeptical revelation, when 
the dancing or doctrinal analysis is called out as artifice, we recognize 
our own knowledge of the “public secret” that ritual is not reality. Re-
lieved of the need to act as if the ritual is real, we can observe and evalu-
ate the doctrinal or magical practice itself as an artificial technique that 
can be more or less effective depending on the particular problem and the 
practitioner’s specific approach. Moreover, because it brings the tension 
between artifice and reality to the surface, unmasking ritual or doctrinal 
artifice sets up a new conflict. It reveals the tension between the practi-
tioner’s obviously flawed and limited technique and the ideal of a prac-
tice that could produce magical or legal results without individual human 
intervention. After the unmasking, we watch the magician or judge’s 
performance in a new way, freed from the effort to suspend disbelief. We 
no longer need to work to avoid recognizing the practitioner’s conscious 
intervention. Instead, we are freed to watch the practitioner wrestle with 
the artificial technique to produce results that are recognizably magical 
or legal. Rather than a false struggle to make artifice appear real, we can 
watch a real struggle unfold. 
Once we are no longer required to treat doctrinal analysis as the 
cause of the legal outcome, we may be freer to appreciate its value as the 
form of that outcome. In this view, doctrinal analysis is a way of enacting 
a liability result that is separate from the will of the decision maker. That 
separation comes about not because the liability result was caused by 
something other than individual human intelligence. Instead, doctrinal 
techniques connect the result to a collective ideal of legality as an imag-
ined and performed subordination of individual will to collective princi-
ples.
260
 Doctrinal analysis can be seen as an enactment (rather than a 
transparent expression) of the individual decision maker’s subordination 
to a formal, collectively approved legal process. This is a fundamentally 
ritual view of doctrine, but it is a rich view of ritual. Judges who 
  
 259. Id. 
 260. A related idea is found in Judith Resnik’s suggestion that legal process’s constraining 
effect on government power comes about in part through adjudication’s enactment of equality be-
tween powerful government officials and vulnerable individuals. Judith Resnik, The Role of the 
Judge in the Twenty-First Century: Whither and Whether Adjudication, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 
(2006) (“The literal and material presence of adjudication stems in part from its performative quali-
ties . . . .”); see also Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and 
Public Sphere(s), 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (2011) (“[P]ublicity in courts disciplines gov-
ernments by making visible how they treat both their judges and disputants.”). 
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acknowledge doctrines’ instrumental uselessness arguably make the en-
actment of ritual subordination all the more powerful as ritual. They re-
veal the effort it costs the individual decision maker to enact that subor-
dination properly.  
Like the witch doctor’s dance, doctrinal analysis is an act—a per-
formance—that is complex and taxing for the practitioner. To some ex-
tent, the power of such a performance is at its zenith when a performer 
can simultaneously produce the required form and acknowledge the inev-
itable gap between form and reality. When we need not consider how 
convincing the performance is as a representation of reality, we can con-
centrate on the performance itself. As the theater director Julie Taymor 
explains, “[W]hen you get rid of the masking, then even though the me-
chanics are apparent, the whole effect is more magical. . . . It’s not be-
cause it’s an illusion and we don’t know how it’s done. It’s because we 
know exactly how it’s done.”261 
For instance, I vividly recall a play I saw years ago that piled one 
arcane and obvious theatricality upon another, with no concessions to 
naturalism.
262
 The part of a grandmother was played by a young male 
actor in a crazy grey wig and wheelchair.
263
 At a certain point in the play, 
the grandmother gets some sad news. In response, the actor took a small 
plastic bottle from a pocket of his flowered house dress, uncapped the 
bottle, tilted up his face, and squeezed a couple of drops into each eye. 
After he carefully recapped and replaced the bottle, he sat upright and 
immobile, facing the audience, as tears, presumably precipitated by 
whatever substance was in the bottle, began streaming down his face. 
There was no question of the audience (or for that matter the actor) being 
fooled into believing that he was really crying, although of course he was 
really crying in the sense that real tears were really coming out of his 
eyes. There was no attempt to make us believe that those tears were 
caused by real feelings of sadness, or that there was anything real to be 
sad about. It was all deliberate artifice.  
What could be more artificial than glycerin tears? Yet the image of 
the old lady weeping was in some way more affecting than it would have 
been if the actor had palmed the bottle and made it appear that his tears 
were caused by real sadness, or if an actress who actually looked the part 
of a grandmother had burst into tears in a way that looked or perhaps 
even was in some sense “authentic,” for instance, by recalling some sad 
event from her real life. With the artifice on full display, we were moved 
by something we knew was real—the actor’s unmasked display of tech-
nique itself and, perhaps, by the gap between the limits of technique and 
  
 261. Daniel Mendelsohn, Why She Fell, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 12, 2011, at 33. 
 262. The show was Rumstick Road, a theater piece created by The Wooster Group, circa 1977, 
directed by Elizabeth LeCompte. 
 263. It was the late great actor, Ron Vawter. 
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the complex reality of human feeling and the actor’s effort to bridge that 
gap with nothing but artificial techniques. The wonder is that something 
so far from reality could nevertheless produce something so really affect-
ing. Likewise, when a judge performing doctrinal analysis acknowledges 
directly that doctrine is not the real cause of her decision, we may find 
the doctrinal rationale for that decision more persuasive. We see the ex-
tent to which doctrinal analysis is a constraint, not because it can deter-
mine the outcome but because the judge who determines that outcome 
another way is nevertheless compelled to go through the doctrinal analy-
sis publicly and to make that analysis as persuasive as possible. The 
compulsion to perform attentively, diligently, and persuasively itself 
becomes the basis of the subordination of the individual decision maker 
to the doctrine.  
The power of these performances does not depend on a belief in a 
transcendent magical, emotional, or legal source. The performance does 
not persuade us because it fools us into believing that it is a sign of some 
other, bigger, more important, or more transcendent cause than the per-
former’s art. Confronting the artificiality of the construction does not 
derail the drama, ritual, or doctrinal analysis but actually heightens the 
effect of the performance by simultaneously highlighting the performer’s 
mastery and vulnerability. We witness the performing magician, actor, or 
judge struggle to manage the artifice of the technique and the gap be-
tween that technique and reality in order to produce results we can accept 
as authentic. The struggle can never be completely successful, but the 
struggle is genuine, and we can judge its results to be more or less satis-
factory.  
IV. DANCING DOCTRINAL QUESTIONS AND THE VALUE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 
Exposing the artifice through which fallible individuals construct 
magical, dramatic, or legal results apparently gives those results power 
they never would have had if we were still in the realm of the unspoken 
public secret. But is that power legitimate? In particular, is it legitimate 
to increase legal doctrine’s persuasive power without increasing doctrinal 
determinacy? It would require another lengthy article to fully examine 
the legitimacy issues that arise from exposing doctrinal indeterminacy 
while continuing to practice doctrinal analysis.
264
 In this final Part then, I 
will just offer some preliminary observations.  
  
 264. One might, of course, conclude that revelations of doctrinal indeterminacy have no signif-
icant effects on the legitimacy of doctrinal practice because they do not disturb that practice. In this 
view, even doctrinal judges’ self-critiques are inconsequential because they do not deter the practice 
of doctrinal analyses. Thus the legitimacy of doctrinal decisions is simply whatever it would be 
without the skeptical critiques. I do not share this perspective. This entire Article springs from the 
observation that articulating critiques of doctrinal practice while continuing that practice is a puz-
zling and significant phenomenon. 
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It is not hard to see that if unmasking only preserves a misguided 
belief in doctrinal determinacy, then unmasking undermines the legiti-
macy of the formal legal process it preserves. I will outline that view 
briefly in what amounts to an extension of the realist critique of doctrine. 
There is another, contrary perspective, however, that I want to point out 
as well without either fully exploring or endorsing it. Through the lens of 
ritual theory, we might see the combination of doctrinal illusion and rev-
elation as a morally complex practice that enacts both a ritual for subor-
dinating individual choice to doctrine and the recognition that any such 
ritual depends on illusion. In this view, legal practitioners act as if their 
collective formal process defers individual choice while acknowledging 
the reality that individual choice is always involved in legal results.
265
 
Although it is much harder to see how commitment to illusion can lead 
to legitimacy, I do not think that we can rule out altogether such a nor-
mative defense.  
From the realists’ instrumental perspective, the combination of doc-
trinal analysis with skepticism about doctrinal efficacy is at best incoher-
ent and at worst deceptive. It obfuscates by pretending to come clean. It 
legitimizes the illegitimate by inoculating judicial decisions against real-
ist skepticism. Ritual theory offers a response to, or perhaps a reorienta-
tion of, that realist critique exactly because it views ritual practice as not 
entirely instrumental. Anthropologists have long pointed to the interac-
tion of belief and make-believe in ritual as a way to bring to the surface, 
traffic with, and symbolically reconcile conflicting social norms.
266
 We 
might see unmasking doctrinal indeterminacy as a ritual enactment of the 
apparently irreconcilable tension between objectivity and transparency in 
law. Our concept of law requires that legal decisions be based on some-
thing other than individual choice, but our understanding of reality is that 
no set of transcendental norms and doctrinal formulas is capable of re-
moving individual choice from legal decision making. From this perspec-
tive, rather than perpetuating a fraud or delusion, ritually unmasking doc-
trinal indeterminacy enacts the problem of this contradiction. To be sure, 
it is not a solution to that problem. But neither is it only a hypocritical 
disguise. 
A. The Realist View: Doctrinal Magic as False Illusion 
If revealing doctrinal indeterminacy is ultimately a way to perpetu-
ate naïve or cynical acceptance of doctrinal artifice as reality, it is obvi-
ously illegitimate. Considering that combining revelations of doctrinal 
  
 265. Cf. SELIGMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 7–11. 
 266. Thurman Arnold, one of the original realists, argued that adjudication enacts similar kinds 
of reconciliation. THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT iii–v (1935) (describing a 
similar theory of reconciliation as the premise of his work); see also Allen, supra note 13, at 803–04 
(compiling citations to Arnold’s work supporting this reconciliatory theory); Bybee supra note 13, at 
316–22 (analyzing Arnold’s scholarship and reaching a similar conclusion). 
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indeterminacy with doctrinal analysis seems ultimately to strengthen the 
power of doctrinal practice, one can see that combination as another, 
more sophisticated form of duplicity. As Michael Taussig observed, “[I]n 
its unmasking, magic is in fact made even more opaque.”267 Unmasking 
the trick is basically another trick, a way of further masking power.  
Undeniably, there is a way in which exposing the secret of doctrinal 
indeterminacy protects that secret. When a judge calls out the indetermi-
nacy of doctrine but still relies on doctrine, she gains credibility for tell-
ing the truth and then proceeds to use that credit to obscure her responsi-
bility for the decision. The revelation is a way to build trust. As one psy-
chologist explains, revealing a weakness in your argument before making 
your strongest point disarms your audience: “By mentioning a downside, 
you establish yourself as a credible source of information.”268 The 
judge’s acknowledgment of her doctrinal technique’s indeterminacy right 
before launching into a complicated doctrinal analysis convinces us to let 
down our skeptical guard and accept her doctrinal approach. Paradoxical-
ly, the unmasking further masks. Momentary transparency about the un-
certainty and subjectivity of the decision-making process winds up con-
tributing to an illusion of overall objectivity. It produces a more ad-
vanced and more deeply dishonest form of the doctrinal charade that the 
realists criticized. 
Realists consider doctrinal faith hypocritical or naïve. But there is a 
kind of hypocrisy or naiveté in the realist approach as well. Realism de-
nies the complexity of the problem posed by the requirement that a legal 
decision must be based on something other than individual choice and 
the realistic understanding that individual choice is necessarily in-
volved.
269
 The point that the realist critique often disregards is that any 
process that calls itself “legal” requires a commitment to decision mak-
ing guided by something other than the decision maker’s own choices. 
When realists suggest that the solution to the problem of doctrinal illu-
sion is simply to have judges spell out clearly their individual views of 
the policy factors that should determine the outcome, they ignore the 
magnitude of the legitimacy problem raised by that transparently subjec-
tive approach. Calling judges’ preferences “policy analysis” as opposed 
to “personal taste” does not change the fact that the realist response ef-
fectively does away with the most basic criterion of legality.  
Jerome Frank used to rail against the idea that the desire for objec-
tive, determinate legal rules made the existence of such rules real.
270
 Just 
because you might like to have legal certainty doesn’t make it possible, 
  
 267. Taussig, supra note 1, at 241. 
 268. Peter Wilby, Persuasion Is a Science, NEWSTATESMAN (Feb. 26, 2007), 
http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2007/02/politicians-cialdini-social. 
 269. See SELIGMAN ET AL., supra note 247, at 107–08, for a similar point regarding what they 
call the “sincere” view. 
 270. FRANK, supra note 11, at 52–53. 
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he said.
271
 But Frank offered no response to the legitimacy problem we 
face if we fall back completely on a transparently individual decision-
making process with no formal collective structure. Just as the desire for 
magic carpets does not make them real, the reality of indeterminate, sub-
jective judicial decisions does not make them legitimate. In a democratic 
society, it is not legitimate for legal decisions that direct government 
force to be made by tricks that create an illusion of rule-based determina-
cy. But neither is it legitimate to simply default to individual judicial 
choices. In this light, eschewing all formal doctrinal analysis in favor of 
transparent policy analysis would not necessarily provide a more legiti-
mate resolution to the problem of doctrinal indeterminacy. 
B. The Ritual View: Revealing Doctrinal Illusion Enacts the Problem of 
Legal Legitimacy 
Perhaps ironically, the realists’ own identification of affinities be-
tween doctrinal analysis and ritual magic points to a potential value of 
formal doctrinal practice. When a judge both deploys proximate cause 
doctrines and points to doctrinal artifice, she makes the trick transparent 
and exposes the rock-and-a-hard-place problem faced by courts after the 
realist critique. The judge who practices doctrinal reasoning while ac-
knowledging its indeterminacy enacts both a commitment to impersonal 
“blind” legal decision making (as opposed to policy making) and the 
recognition that her own subjective attitudes shape her legal decisions.  
As ritual, judges’ exposure of doctrinal indeterminacy is a way for 
them to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of doctrinal fiction 
and realist skepticism. Given the requirement that a legal decision must 
be based on something other than personal choice, it is really not open to 
judges to give up all formal doctrinal practices. Continuing doctrinal 
practice without acknowledging its indeterminacy leaves judges open to 
the kind of “gotcha” moment Evans-Pritchard pulled off when he ex-
posed the witch doctor’s palmed charcoal. So judges expose their own 
artifice. Such exposure is obviously self-protective. At the same time, the 
judicial exposure of indeterminacy invites a different kind of critical 
scrutiny of legal decisions. It prompts us to inquire not only whether the 
judge correctly interpreted the proximate cause tea leaves but also 
whether his deployment of elastic proximate cause doctrines can be 
squared with both traditional practices of doctrinal analysis and social 
policy objectives in a way that can be properly characterized as a legal 
result.  
A thoroughgoing realist would say that if we cannot have objective 
legal determinations, let us at least preserve legal transparency by mak-
ing judges’ subjective policy choices fully apparent. For a realist, the 
judge who acknowledges indeterminacy (and thus the impossibility of 
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legal objectivity) but refuses to make her policy analysis clear is only 
compounding the problem by adding dishonesty to indeterminacy. But 
from the perspective of ritual theory, mixing doctrinal practice with 
skepticism may be seen as enacting a continued commitment to both 
objectivity and transparency without denying the complexity, or perhaps 
the impossibility, of reconciling those values. 
CONCLUSION 
When the realists criticized doctrine as magic, they doubtless hoped 
to put an end to the doctrinal magic show. Instead, something much 
stranger has happened. Doctrinal analysis continues, but not because the 
realist critique failed. Nearly a hundred years after the realists contended 
that doctrines like proximate cause were just a bunch of “magic words,” 
both doctrine and skepticism about doctrine are still going strong. I have 
argued here that the realists’ comparison of law and magic may help us 
solve the riddle of doctrine’s survival in the face of doctrinal indetermi-
nacy. We can see the apparently contradictory combination of doctrinal 
practice and skepticism as another version of magicians’ selective revela-
tions of the illusions they construct. I have also offered some ideas about 
how such revelations might work to strengthen the practice they expose. 
The remaining questions are about efficacy and legitimacy. Does the 
comparison of law to magic offer any new reason to think the continued 
use of indeterminate doctrinal forms has something to contribute to a 
legitimate rule of law? Must we conclude that doctrine revealed is doc-
trine debunked? Or, if ritual theory can explain how skepticism and illu-
sion coexist, might it also provide some basis for reconsidering and 
maintaining formal doctrinal practice?  
 
